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ABSTRACT
This Article investigates the sacred origins of the corporate form. It
sheds light on the sacred rituals performed to establish Ancient Roman
cities as legal entities. It discusses the role of the Roman Catholic Church
in developing the corporate form and in giving birth to a systemized set of
rules regulating corporations, which we commonly call corporate law. It
analyzes the limitations to the use of the corporate form in Islamic law as
well as the streams of Islamic law jurisprudence that recognize legal
capacity to specific entities with religious, social, or charitable purposes.
It surveys the characteristics of two ecclesiastic institutions that have
contributed to the development of the modern corporate form, namely
monasteries and cathedrals. The insights of this Article help advance a
critical understanding of the origins, nature, and attributes of modern
business corporations. They also facilitate reflections on the relation
between purpose and the corporate form.
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INTRODUCTION
Business corporations are civic institutions with sacred origins.1 All
corporations have sacred origins.2 While Ancient Rome and the Church
have played the most significant role in developing coherent legislation
and theory for corporations, the necessity to sever property from human
beings’ ownership has been a critical issue across practically all
civilizations.3 Different legal and societal traditions have developed
different solutions to achieve asset partitioning.4

1. In Avner Greif’s words, “[a]n institution is a system of rules, beliefs, norms, and organizations
that together generate a regularity of (social) behavior.” AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH
TO THE MODERN ECONOMY 30 (2006).
2. See infra Part I.
3. See id.
4. On the essential role of asset partitioning, see generally Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman,
The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000) (discussing asset partitioning);
Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 1333 (2006) (describing the origins of asset partitioning).
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Religious law has had a pioneering role in corporate law for two
reasons. First, several gods and divinities, across numerous religions, are
eternal or sempiternal. Eternal means that they have always existed and
will always exist. Sempiternal means that they were born at a point in time,
but they will exist forever. Eternal and sempiternal gods and divinities,
especially the anthropomorphous, have forced thinkers and legislators to
deal with entities able to own property and exercise legal capacity
potentially forever. Second, worshiping eternal and sempiternal gods and
providing the faithful with a solid organizational infrastructure to exercise
their faith has required legal and organizational solutions to protect the
assets committed to religious purposes.
Like many divinities, corporations can exist forever and can own
assets.5 These two attributes are at the very core of the corporate form;
they have provided an answer to the organizational necessities of most
civilizations and determined the disruptive success of corporate entities,
including business corporations. Nevertheless, as discussed in this Article,
not all legal traditions provide and regulate the corporate form.6 In fact,
despite its sacred origins, the corporate form is not common to all religious
legal traditions.7
The sacred origins of the corporate form trace back to Ancient Rome,
when it was first deployed to establish cities through sacred rituals.8
Through the Roman Catholic Church (the Church), corporate law and
theory bound themselves to sacred authority even more deeply. The
Church developed and systematized the use of the corporate form,
regulated the attributes of corporations, and gave birth to a set of rules
governing the relations among the stakeholders of ecclesiastic
corporations, which, in substance, is corporate law.9
Sacred law is a source of insights on the corporate form. This holds
true even for religious law that does not provide the corporate form. Legal
traditions that do not rely on the corporate form but aim at similar results—
subtracting property from human beings’ ownership and committing it to
eternal or long-term causes—have achieved asset partitioning through
different organizational models and through jurisprudence.10 Observing
the solutions developed to achieve asset partitioning in absence of the
corporate form allows us to critically assess the corporate form and its
attributes.
5. See infra Part I.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See id.
8. See infra Section I.A.
9. See infra Section I.B.
10. See infra Part II.
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For example, this Article discusses how Islamic law does not provide
the corporate form, and it achieves asset partitioning for assets committed
to religious, charitable, and social purposes through jurisprudence or by
attributing the ownership of the assets to God.11 God’s or divinities’
ownership of assets is not exclusive to Islamic law; the Romans used a
similar model to own and govern the assets of a family.12 Similar models
exist in ecclesiastical law, too.13
The experience of Islamic law with the corporate form forces one to
reflect on the paramount importance of asset partitioning.14 Islamic law
also requires one to reflect on the connection between the corporate form
and the purpose of the entity. In addition, since Islamic law does not limit
the accountability of individuals with interests in a business, the tension
between the corporate form and Islamic law principles provides an
invitation to critically weigh benefits and shortcomings of limited liability
for shareholders.
An account of the sacred law and jurisprudence governing
corporations and asset partitioning facilitates a critical understanding of
modern business corporations. To this end, this Article discusses two key
institutions in ecclesiastic law: monasteries and cathedrals. Cathedrals and
monasteries have been conceived for perpetual worshipping of God in an
organized and stable fashion.15
By observing the principles and goals that informed the conception
and development of monasteries and cathedrals, it can be deduced that the
core goal of the corporate form is subtracting assets from human
ownership and committing those assets to a high cause, potentially forever.
In fact, the corporate form makes it possible to aggregate assets and
subtract these assets from human ownership.16 The corporate form also
makes it possible to commit the aggregated assets to predetermined causes.
Moreover, corporations and corporate ownership can last theoretically
forever.17
11. See id.
12. See infra Section I.A.2. Hindu Idols also have capacity to own the assets donated to them.
See generally Patrick William Duff, The Personality of an Idol, 3 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 42 (1927)
(discussing the legal personhood of Hindu Idols).
13. See infra Section III.A.4.
14. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 4.
15. See infra Part III.
16. Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci, Archeology, Language, and Nature of Business
Corporations, 89 MISS. L.J. 43, 56 (2019).
17. With respect to the ability of corporations to exist forever, Blackstone wrote that
it has been found necessary, when it is for the advantage of the public to have particular
rights kept on foot and continued, to constitute artificial persons, who may maintain
perpetual succession, and enjoy a kind of legal immortality.
These artificial persons are called bodies politic, bodies corporate (corpora corporata), or
corporations . . . .
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So, a corporation is first and foremost a legal technology deployed to
own and govern assets, potentially forever.18 All the additional features of
a corporation such as the capacity to enter into contracts and stand in court
are ancillary to the core corporate capacity to own property forever.
Universities, monasteries, cathedrals, and businesses often take the
corporate form.19 Monasteries and cathedrals aggregate and own assets to
ultimately facilitate the worshipping of God. Conversely, business
corporations aggregate and own assets to conduct an economic activity.
Corporations aggregate assets through external contributions—such as
donations or investments—and economic activities.20
A corporation’s ability to own property and be legally capable is
typically referred to as legal personhood. Legal personhood for nonhuman entities is arguably the highest invention lawyers and policymakers
have achieved in the Western tradition.21 Corporations govern their assets
through decision-making mechanics that overcome contractual principles
and resemble decision-making mechanics of governments.22 Just like
governments, corporations operate on authority, not consensus. David
Ciepley’s description of corporations as “franchised governments” well
captures many of their essential characteristics.23
First, as mentioned, corporations, just like governments, feature
decision-making mechanics based on authority.24 Authority can have
sacred roots, secular roots, or both.25 Second, as the concession theory
emphasizes, corporations receive authority and legal personhood from a
sovereign entity like a state.26 In fact, states themselves are understood to
receive authority and legitimacy from the people or the divine.27 Often the
narrative about the source and origins of authority and legitimacy of a state
combines a divine dimension with popular support.28
An example of how corporations’ decision-making mechanics and
principles resemble those of governments are the procedures to adopt,
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *566.
18. See infra Part I.
19. See generally Gramitto Ricci, supra note 16 (arguing that the corporate form is a legal
technology used to organize endeavors of a various types).
20. See infra Part II.
21. PATRICK WILLIAM DUFF, PERSONALITY IN ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 62 (1938); see Gramitto
Ricci, supra note 16, at 47.
22. David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of the Corporation,
107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139, 141 (2013).
23. Id. at 151–56.
24. Id. at 151–52.
25. See infra Part II.
26. Ciepley, supra note 22, at 154.
27. See generally BRIAN TIERNEY, RELIGION, LAW AND THE GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL
THOUGHT, 1150–1650 (1982) (discussing secular and ecclesiastical theories of government).
28. See generally id.
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amend, or repeal bylaws under Delaware Corporate Law.29 The procedure
to amend corporate bylaws does not appear contractual in nature, as it is
not based on the consensus of all the affected parties; rather, it operates on
a decisional model based on authority that allows a qualified percentage
of the parties to make decisions that affect both those in favor and those
against those decisions.
This Article strives to advance the understanding of business
corporations by shedding light on their origins and nature, as well as a
number of their attributes that are often overlooked. Under the auspices of
enriching the debate on fundamental matters in corporate law, this Article
offers several insights on the corporate form, including underscoring the
property nature of corporations. The insights that underscore the property
nature of corporations provide a point of view that somewhat counters the
contractual nature of corporations masterfully argued in Easterbrook and
Fischel’s work.30
By providing an innovative framework, this Article also aims to shift
the focus of mainstream corporate law from the analysis of agency costs,
as shaped by Jensen and Meckilng’s seminal article Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, to an
understanding of corporations that highlights the wonders of the corporate
form.31 For example, insights about cathedrals and monasteries advance
the understanding of the groundbreaking organizational benefits that the
corporate form provides.32
Moreover, this Article strives to nurture key corporate law debates
such as the relationship between the corporate form and the purpose of
corporations as well as to spark reflections on attributes of corporations
that are often taken for granted. In Islamic law, the debate about the
admissibility of the corporate form largely revolves around the tension in
Islamic law between the mandate of individuals’ accountability and the
necessity of committing assets to specific purposes by subtracting them
from human beings’ ownership. Such tension highlights the relevance of
a critical assessment of policies often taken for granted such as limited
liability for shareholders and directors.

29. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (2015).
30. See generally, Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989) (discussing the contractual nature of the corporate form).
31. See generally, Michael C. Jensen & William H.Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 4 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (discussing the
ownership structure of firms and agency costs)
32. See generally Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation as Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity,
Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685 (2015) (discussing
the wonders that a business corporation, as a technology, can make).
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In addition, the Islamic law jurisprudence that accepts legal
personhood only for entities that pursue a public purpose—typically
religious, social, or charitable—highlights the relevance of a critical
assessment of the public dimension of purpose also for contemporary
business corporations. The debate on the purpose of business corporations
is a classic of corporate law.33 The insights of this Article help advance the
understanding of the nature of corporations and nurture the debate on their
purpose.
Part I of this Article investigates the sacred origins of the corporate
form and corporate law, looking mostly at the role played by Ancient
Rome and the Church. Part II discusses the tension between the corporate
form and traditional Islamic law as well as the use of God’s ownership to
subtract assets from human beings’ ownership and the Islamic law
jurisprudence that makes it possible to recognize legal entities, according
to certain criteria, when they pursue religious, social, or charitable
purposes. Part III describes monasteries and cathedrals, two ecclesiastic
institutions that exemplify the Church’s use of the corporate form and its
attributes.
I. THE SACRED ORIGINS OF THE CORPORATION
The first corporations in the Western tradition were Roman cities.34
Cities were established through sacred rites and legislation.35 Through
33. Adolph A. Berle and Merrick Dodd exchanged their views on the purpose of corporations in
a famous exchange that appeared in the Harvard Law Review. In his contribution, Berle advocated for
shareholder value maximization. A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1049, 1049 (1931). Conversely, Dodd highlighted the social role of business corporations. E.
Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1148
(1932). Later, Berle stated that “[t]he argument has been settled (at least for the time being) squarely
in favor of Professor Dodd’s contention.” ADOLPH A. BERLE, THE TWENTIETH (20TH) CENTURY
CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954). Then in 1970, Milton Friedman wrote a seminal article in the
New York Times, in which he stated that business corporations and their executives have the exclusive
mandate to increase their profits and respect the law. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of
Business
Is
to
Increase
Its
Profits,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
13,
1970),
https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-ofbusiness-is-to.html. The debate on the nature and purpose of business corporations has continued to
attract some of the most influential scholars who have proposed alternatives to the shareholder value
maximization paradigm. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (arguing that the directors of public corporations
should maximize the welfare of stakeholders who contribute firm-specific resources); Ciepley, supra
note 22 (discussing the partly-private-partly-public nature of business corporations); R. EDWARD
FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984) (detailing the stakeholder
theory).
34. DUFF, supra note 21, at 62.
35. NUMA DENIS FUSTEL DE COULANGES, THE ANCIENT CITY: A STUDY ON THE RELIGION,
LAWS, AND INSTITUTIONS OF GREECE AND ROME 134–38 (Doubleday Anchor Books 1956); see also
DUFF, supra note 21, at 62; Gramitto Ricci, supra note 16, at 44–45.

420

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 45:413

sacred rites, the Romans drew the borders of cities and created entities
with legislation that are, in iconic language on the corporate form,
“invisible, intangible, existing only in the contemplation of the law.”36
Both today and throughout history, different types of corporations have
existed. The essential features of the corporate form are common across
all types of corporations. A corporation aggregates and locks in assets
forever.37 The corporate form also provides mechanics, principles, and
rules to govern the assets owned and produced by a corporation.
Although all corporations are characterized as entities with legal
capacity (which can be understood as a genus), different types of
corporations (which can be understood as a species) have been developed
to pursue different goals and to solve different conundra. Different types
of corporations can be categorized using a number of criteria. Some
distinctions are straightforward; for example, for-profit corporations can
be easily distinguished from nonprofit corporations. But other distinctions
are more subtle.
In his scholarship, Ciepley discusses the distinction between
property corporations and member corporations and argues that modern
American business corporations are property corporations, not member
corporations.38 The distinction between property corporations and member
corporations is subtle because business organizations fall on a spectrum
that has business organizations based mainly on members’ characteristics
and skills on one of its ends, and business organizations based primarily
on property (typically relying on delegated management) on the other
end.39 Moreover, as Ciepley points out, the mere shift from pro-capita
voting (i.e., one vote for each member) to pro-quota voting (i.e., voting
power proportional to the size of the interest) could affect the certainty of
the categorization.40 Such a distinction plays a significant role in the
analytical and normative discussions about the nature and purpose of
business corporations. This Article recognizes such a distinction and traces
it back to the systemization of the corporate form that Pope Sinibaldo de’

36. Trs. Of Darthmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819). For an analysis
of the relevance of the case in understanding the nature of corporations, see generally Margaret M.
Blair, How Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward Clarified Corporate Law (Vand. Univ. L.
Sch., Working Paper No. 21-19, 2021) (emphasizing the role of the state in the chartering process).
For a detailed description of the sacred rite the Romans followed to establish Rome and other cities,
see FUSTEL DE COULANGES, supra note 35.
37. Margaret Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers
in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 388–89 (2003); Stout, supra note 32, at 690–91.
38. See David Ciepley, Member Corporations, Property Corporations, and Constitutional
Rights, 11 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 31, 38–39 (2017).
39. See infra Section I.A.2.
40. Ciepley, supra note 38, at 51–52.
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Fieschi (Sinibaldo) theorized in his body of work.41 Ultimately, however,
this Article places emphasis on the deepest common nature of corporations
as legal entities provided with legal capacity and a governance system
based on authority.42
The term “corporation” refers to a number of entities with legal
capacity that have developed throughout the centuries.43 The term
“corporation,” from a legal point of view, is not necessarily related to a
specific activity, namely business for profit. There are nonprofit
corporations, ecclesiastic corporations, corporations with shareholders,
corporations without shareholders, and the list goes on. Monasteries and
cathedrals are corporations, just like business corporations are
corporations. So, a monastery organized as a corporation and a business
organized as a corporation have a common nature. A monastery, as a
corporate entity, owns buildings and lands, which constitute the physical
dimension of the monastery. It can also own a variety of additional assets
such as books and paintings.44 The monastery, its assets, and its activities
are ultimately aimed at worshipping God and carrying out related
activities.
The Roman Catholic God is eternal, and the monastery has been
conceived and developed to potentially exist forever, to pursue its
worshipping ends and ancillary activities.45 Corporations, in fact, are
sempiternal. A business corporation shares its legal and organizational
nature with that of a monastery. It aggregates and locks in assets without
a time limitation and has a system in place to govern assets and economic
activities.
The differences between business corporations and monasteries
come down mainly to essentially two aspects: their respective purposes
and the presence of shareholders. The purpose of a business corporation is
primarily oriented toward the economic activities it conducts, whereas a
monastery has primarily a religious scope.46 In addition, different than a
monastery, a business corporation allows certain investors, known as
shareholders, to have an equity interest in the activities the business
corporation conducts. Moreover, shareholders have a say in certain matters
that affect the governance of the corporation, and their governance power
is typically proportional to the size of their investment in the business
corporation.
41. See infra Section I.B. 2.
42. See infra Section I.A. 2.
43. See Gramitto Ricci, supra note 16, at 45.
44. See infra Section III.A.
45. See id.
46. On the purpose of business corporations, see supra note 7.
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Another characterizing trait of business corporations is the
transferability of shares along with the governance power and economic
interest they carry. Shareholders can buy, hold, and trade shares in a
business corporation. So, absent restrictions on transferability of shares,
the governance power carried by shares circulates as shares are sold and
purchased on the market. In a listed business corporation—i.e., a
corporation whose shares are listed on a stock exchange—free
transferability of shares entails that the corporation, its board of directors,
or its investors cannot select or repel shareholders.47
A. Aggregating Assets for Eternal Purposes
Corporations were born in Ancient Rome.48 The Romans invented
legal capacity for nonhuman legal entities in order to organize their
governmental system.49 As mentioned previously, the first corporations
were cities.50 The Romans recognized that cities had legal capacity and
could self-govern in compliance with the law.51 The model can actually be
described in a very succinct fashion, but the concept at the core of the
corporate form is groundbreaking. It provides the mechanics for asset
partitioning, autonomous governance, and potentially sempiternal
existence.52 In other words, humankind developed a legal technology able
to own property, operate in society through agents, and survive transient
human beings.
1. Establishing Cities
The Romans established a city when the civitas, which was the
religious and political association of families, the phratries (groups of
families),53 and tribes “agreed to unite and have the same worship.”54

47. But see generally Edward B. Rock, Shareholder Eugenics in the Public Corporation,
97 CORNELL L. REV. 849 (2012) (detailing methodologies applied to attract certain types of
shareholders).
48. DUFF, supra note 21.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. ERNST KANTOROWICZ, THE KING’S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIAEVAL POLITICAL
THEOLOGY 192, 386–87 (1957).
53. FUSTEL DE COULANGES, supra note 35, at 118–20, 127.
54. Id. at 134. Fustel de Coulanges clarifies that
CIVITAS, and URBS, either of which we translate by the word city, were not synonymous
words among the ancients. Civitas was the religious and political association of families
and tribes; Urbs was the place of assembly, the dwelling-place, and, above all, the
sanctuary of this association.
Id.
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Cities were ultimately founded on religious bases; the Romans formed
cities through a sacred rite that gave birth to the urbs all at once.55
In the classic The Ancient City, Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges
describes the process of the establishment of the city of Rome as an
example of how cities were created.56 The creation of the city of Rome
required a formal ritual that included a number of stages such as selecting
the site through the guidance of the Gods; offering a sacrifice on the day
of foundation; digging a trench (known as mundus) in which the founders
of the city would throw some earth brought from their home countries;
setting up an altar and lighting the holy fire of the city upon it; tracing a
sacred furrow; and raising the sacred wall to protect the enclosure.57
So Roman cities were founded with sacred rites and “[s]omething
sacred and divine was naturally associated with these cities.”58 Consistent
with the sacred nature of a city, the anniversary of the foundation of a city
was celebrated with a yearly sacrifice in memory “of the sacred ceremony
which had marked its birth.”59 The formalized, ritualistic establishment
process produced entities able to exist forever, to be sempiternal.60
The sacred rite required for the constitution of cities appears as the
allegory of the process necessary to charter a business corporation. The
Roman way of creating cities was not as simple as chartering a business
corporation in the era of technology and free chartering. Rather, it appears
as the allegory of the ritual procedure that was necessary for centuries to
charter a corporation before free chartering began.61
Before free chartering, a corporation was granted a charter only if the
corporation’s activities and object were deemed to serve the interest of the
state. Just like sacred authority was essential to establish cities, secular
authority has been essential to establish business corporations.62 Typically,
scrutiny of the purpose of the economic activities was necessary before
granting a charter and the corporate form.
The much leaner process required to charter a business corporation
today, although still based on receiving authority from the state, does not
involve a strict assessment of the activities and purpose of the corporation

55. Id. at 134–38.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 142.
59. Id. at 141.
60. Id. at 142.
61. See generally Blair, supra note 37 (emphasizing the role of the state in the incorporation
process).
62. See generally Ciepley, supra note 22 (discussing the nature of business corporations in the
U.S.).
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to be chartered.63 The oversimplification of the chartering process has
hidden the somewhat supernatural process that establishing a corporate
entity requires. This, in turn, might have increasingly lightened the
requirements to receive a charter. The result is the current disconnect
between the establishment of a corporation and the assessment of society’s
interest in the activities of the chartered corporation.
2. Divinities and Asset Partitioning
To say that a corporation is ultimately a legal technology, with roots
in sacred or secular authority, used to own and govern property forever
means implicitly placing emphasis on one aspect of legal capacity: the
ability to own private property. So, an informed assessment of the role of
religion at the origins of the corporate form cannot overlook the role of
religion at the origins of private property. In fact, although the average
person probably takes an individual’s capacity to own private property for
granted, this has not always been the case everywhere in the world.64
Distinctively, religion played a key role with respect to the capacity
to own private property. As Coulanges wrote:
In the greater number of primitive societies the right of property was
established by religion. In the Bible, the Lord said to Abraham, “I am
the Lord, that brought thee out of Ur of the Chaldees, to give thee this
land, to inherit it;” and to Moses, “Go up hence, . . . into the land
which I sware unto Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, saying, Unto
thee will I give it.”
Thus God, the primitive proprietor, by right of creation, delegates to
man his ownership over a part of the soil.65

The Western story of private property is intertwined not only with
the role of religion, but also with the role of the Roman family, a key
institution in Roman law and society.66 In Coulanges’s words:
There are three things which, from the most ancient times, we find
founded and solidly established in these Greek and Italian societies:
the domestic religion; the family; and the right of property—three
things which had in the beginning a manifest relation, and which
appear to have been inseparable. The idea of private property existed
in the religion itself.67

63. See generally Blair, supra note 37 (emphasizing the role of the state in the incorporation
process).
64. FUSTEL DE COULANGES, supra note 35, at 60.
65. Id. at 66 (alteration in original).
66. Id. at 61–63.
67. Id. at 61.
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In Ancient Rome, the concept of private property evolved together
with that of asset partitioning.68 In Ancient Rome, determining what
property belonged to a family was key.69 The assets of a family belonged
to the family itself rather than to its members.70 The family assets were
under the surveillance and custody of the gods of the family and could not
leave the family71. The family property was protected by the furrow
surrounding the family’s land, which created a sacred enclosure much like
that of a Roman city.72 In fact, “[t]he house is consecrated by the perpetual
presence of gods; it is a temple which preserves them.”73 Ultimately, the
family gods protected the family property in perpetuity. Family ownership
established a form of sacred asset partitioning, and religion protected the
family assets from thieves because entering the “house with any
malevolent intention was a sacrilege.”74
Ownership vested in divine entities has allowed individuals to
subtract assets from human beings’ ownership and to commit those assets
for a purpose or a cause.75 Divine entities are typically eternal or
sempiternal. Therefore, ownership vested in divine entities and the
consequential asset partitioning can be sempiternal. In sum, divine
ownership—a divinity’s capacity to own assets—allows human beings to
achieve asset partitioning for assets committed to religious and social
purposes forever.76
Across multiple faiths, divine law relies on ownership vested in
divine entities. For example, with respect to monastic law, this Article
discusses how the Charter of the Cluny Order provided that the order’s
assets belong to Saint Peter and Saint Paul.77 In addition, with respect to
Islamic law, this Article discusses how an important stream of Islamic
jurisprudence achieves asset partitioning, by relying on ownership vested
in Almighty Allāh (God).78
B. The Church and Systemization of Corporate Law
The Church is likely the institution that played the paramount role in
shaping and defining corporate law principles. The belief that the whole
68. Id. at 61–63.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 62–63.
73. Id. at 64.
74. Id.
75. See infra Part II.
76. See id.
77. See infra Section III.A.3. Other examples could be mentioned besides those discussed in this
Article, including that of Hindu Idols with legal personality. DUFF, supra note 21.
78. See infra Part II.
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society of Christians, seen as a collective body, was something more than
a plethora of individuals is as old as the Church itself. However, it was not
until the Middle Ages that theological concepts evolved into legal theories
on legal personhood.79 The body of Christ was associated with the
definition of the Church.80 The aggregation of all Christians (universitas
fidelium) was understood to be a legal person.81 The Latin term universitas
means corporation, and derives from the Latin in unum vertere, which
means “to turn a multitude into one.”82 The etymology of universitas
conveys the idea of an entity resulting from the conversion of a multitude
into a unity. To regulate existence and functioning of universitates, the
Church developed a system of principles and rules that can be considered
the archetype of corporate law.83
The origins of corporate law and corporate theory could arguably be
traced to Sinibaldo, who was elected Pope with the name of Innocent IV.84

79. See generally JOHN J. COUGHLIN, LAW, PERSON, AND COMMUNITY: PHILOSOPHICAL,
THEOLOGICAL, AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON CANON LAW (2012); see also John J. Coughlin,
Canon Law and the Human Person, 19 J. L. & RELIGION 1, 25 (2003); Robert Ombres, Canon Law
and Theology, 14 ECCLESIASTICAL L. 164 (2012).
80. The description of the Christian community can be seen as many parts in one body, the body
of Christ (the corpus mysticum), contained in Saint Paul’s Letter to the Romans. Romans 12: 4–5 (New
American Bible) (“For as in one body we have many parts, and all the parts do not have the same
function, so we, though many, are one body in Christ and individually parts of one another.”). The full
explanation is in 1 Corinthians: 12–27 (New American Bible):
As a body is one though it has many parts, and all the parts of the body, though many, are
one body, so also Christ. For in one Spirit we were all baptized into one body, whether
Jews or Greeks, slaves or free persons, and we were all given to drink of one Spirit. Now
the body is not a single part, but many. If a foot should say, “Because I am not a hand I do
not belong to the body,” it does not for this reason belong any less to the body. Or if an ear
should say, “Because I am not an eye I do not belong to the body,” it does not for this
reason belong any less to the body. If the whole body were an eye, where would the hearing
be? If the whole body were hearing, where would the sense of smell be? But as it is, God
placed the parts, each one of them, in the body as he intended. If they were all one part,
where would the body be? But as it is, there are many parts, yet one body. The eye cannot
say to the hand, “I do not need you,” nor again the head to the feet, “I do not need you.”
Indeed, the parts of the body that seem to be weaker are all the more necessary, and those
parts of the body that we consider less honorable we surround with greater honor, and our
less presentable parts are treated with greater propriety, whereas our more presentable parts
do not need this. But God has so constructed the body as to give greater honor to a part that
is without it, so that there may be no division in the body, but that the parts may have the
same concern for one another. If [one] part suffers, all the parts suffer with it; if one part is
honored, all the parts share its joy. Now you are Christ’s body, and individually parts of it.
81. See JEAN GAUDEMET, STORIA DEL DIRITTO CANONICO: ECCLESIA ET CIVITAS 125 (1998)
(all translations done by the authors).
82. See Gramitto Ricci, supra note 16, at 45.
83. RUFFINI, infra note 104, at 10–11 (all translations done by the authors).
84. Sinibaldo lived between 1195 and 1254. On the life of Sinibaldo De’ Fieschi, see generally
the book of the influential Italian historian ALBERTO MELLONI, INNOCENZO IV: LA CONCEZIONE E
L’ESPERIENZA DELLA CRISTIANITÀ COME REGIMEN UNIUS PERSONAE (1990) (all translations done
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Sinibaldo referred to corporations as fictitious legal persons using
theological concepts.85 Sinibaldo also developed categories to systemize
different types of corporations.86 For example, he created the distinction
between a “member corporation” (collegia personalia) and a “property
corporation” (collegia realia).87 For this purpose, Sinibaldo used criteria
that are still present in the 1983 Code of Canon Law.88
1. The Church, Corporate Law, and Corporate Theory
While Sinibaldo was Pope, the Church had a quandary on its hands:
how to structure an organizational system capable of going beyond
geopolitical borders and survive expansion and changes of sovereign
states. It was then that the Church developed a form of authority that today
is referred to as jurisdiction,89 which consisted in an expression of power
that the Church had over each of the different ecclesiastic entities and the
Church’s corresponding hierarchical structure of power. The concept of
jurisdiction permitted ecclesiastical entities to exercise governance rights
and enforce rules beyond the law of the land.90
Sinibaldo’s theory of the corporation was driven by theological
premises but served very practical purposes. The theological element of
Sinibaldo’s corporation theory was inspired by Saint Paul’s notion of the
“mystical body.”91 Saint Paul’s letters to the Corinthians and Romans both
depicted the Christian community (ekklesia) as a single organism,92 a
unity.93 More specifically, Saint Paul used the image of a body—with
by the authors). In its appendix it is possible to read the complete Vita Innocentii IV scripta a fr.
Nicolao de Carbio [Life of Innocent IV written by friar Nicolao de Carbio].
85. Manuel J. Rodriguez, Innocent IV and the Element of Fiction in Juristic Personalities, 22
JURIST 3, 290–94 (1962).
86. Id. at 291.
87. Id. at 292.
88. 1983 CODE c.115, § 1. Juridic persons in the Church are either aggregates of persons
(universitates personarum) or aggregates of things (universitates rerum). Id. § 2. An aggregate of
persons (universitas personarum), which can be constituted only with at least three persons, is
collegial if the members determine its action through participation in rendering decisions, whether by
equal right or not, according to the norm of law and the statutes; otherwise it is non-collegial. Id. § 3.
An aggregate of things (universitas rerum), or an autonomous foundation, consists of goods or things,
whether spiritual or material, and either one or more physical persons or a college directs it according
to the norm of law and the statutes.
89. On the notion of “jurisdiction” in the history of canon law, see GAUDEMET, supra note 81,
at 219–28 (all translations done by the authors).
90. A striking example is given by the ecclesiastical jurisdiction over “sacred persons” and
“sacred things” in England. See Edwin Maxey, The Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction in England, 3 MICH.
L. REV. 360, 360 (1905).
91. Id.
92. Romans 12: 4–5; 1 Corinthians: 12–27.
93. See Pope Pius XII, Encyclical Mystici Corpori Christi, VATICAN (June 29, 1943),
https://www.vatican.va/content/pius-xii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xii_enc_29061943_mystici-
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Christ as the head and Christians as the body—to describe the relationship
between Christ and Christians.94 Saint Paul called this image “corpus
mysticum.”95 Later, the Church Fathers, including Saint Augustine,
reaffirmed and amplified Saint Paul’s assertion that the Church was the a
spiritual body of Christ.96
At the time of Sinibaldo, the range of legal entities (universitates)
was wide and included not only ecclesiastical entities, such as cathedrals
and monasteries, but also secular entities like universities, hospitals, cities,
and even bridges.97 The legal framework regulating legal persons was all
but homogeneous. Sometimes, church institutions were not recognized by
the secular sovereign and, therefore, could be deemed nonexistent before
the law and without legal protection for their properties.98 Against this
backdrop, Sinibaldo theorized the incorporation of the Church and its
entities. The medieval papacy developed a coherent categorization and
conceptualization of the Church’s legal entities.
2. The Church and Corporate Entities as Established by Sinibaldo
Before being elected Pope and head of the Church, Sinibaldo was an
eminent canon lawyer.99 In the Apparatus in Quinque Libros Decretalium,
he first classified the different types of legal entities, according to
institutional criteria, which established the theory of the legal
personality.100 In the thirteenth century, it was common for the Pope to

corporis-christi.html [https://perma.cc/YDN7-HJJY] [hereinafter Pope Pius XII, Mystici Corpori
Christi] (mentioning St. Paul’s Letters to the Corinthians and the Romans).
94. See supra note 80.
95. A critical reading of the concept “Corpus Mysticum” is in Laurence Paul Hemming, Henri
de Lubac: Reading “Corpus Mysticum”, 90 NEW BLACKFRIARS 519 (2009).
96. See Pope Pius XII, Mystici Corpori Christi, supra note 93.
97. In medieval times, the building and maintenance of a pons (bridge) was often considered as
a pious act that could relieve the builder from sin. To accomplish these tasks, collectives with a legal
personality were founded. After its construction, the bridge could become an autonomous institution
bearing legal personality. In such cases, its rights were administered by a community whose members
would maintain the bridge and give some kind of assistance to travelers and pilgrims crossing it. A
famous example of such a corporation is the Avignon bridge. See Marjorie Nice Boyer, The
Bridgebuilding Brotherhoods, 39 SPECULUM 639, 641–42 (1964); see also Bridge-Building
Brotherhood: Various Religious Associations Founded for the Purpose of Building Bridges, CATH.
ANSWERS, https://www.catholic.com/encyclopedia/bridge-buildingbrotherhood [https://perma.cc/4WAL-Z3WM]. In the same vein, guilds and other lay congregations
showed interest in religious activities to obtain a recognition of their personhood. For example, guilds
sponsored masses, prayers for the dead, church building, religious art, plays, and parade floats based
on the Bible or the lives of saints.
98. See GAUDEMET, supra at 81, at 358, 570 (all translations done by the authors).
99. See MELLONI, supra note 84, at 26 (all translations done by the authors).
100. See generally POPE INNOCENTIUS IV, APPARATUS (COMMENTARIA) IN QUINQUE LIBROS
DECRETALIUM (1570) (all translations done by the authors).
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decide practical questions in a casuistic way while including general
observations in order to support his decisions.101
Sinibaldo, who had analyzed numerous institutions in his work, was
fully aware of the variety of forms that entities could assume such as
prebends, monasteries, churches, or hospitals.102 He was determined to
simplify the organization of the Church and systematize these entities
under the overarching jurisdiction of the Church, in the following ways.103
First, Sinibaldo theorized the corporate form of the Church itself and
placed the corporation at the fulcrum of ecclesiastical law.104 As a
corporation, the Church received authority and legitimacy directly from
God. 105 Second, Sinibaldo shaped and regulated the other ecclesiastic
corporations using the Church’s corporate form as a model.106 He divided
legal persons into two categories: those mainly based on characteristics
and skills of members (collegia personalia) and those mainly based on
assets and patrimony of the entity (collegia realia).107 This distinction
resembles that of property corporations and member corporations.108
According to such a distinction, on one side, the member corporation is an
aggregate of members whose personal qualities are relevant for achieving
the corporate goals, while on the other side, the property corporation is an
aggregate of properties that had procedures for selecting delegated
decision-makers and representatives, who in turn aim to achieve the
corporate objects.109
Sinibaldo argued that “cum collegium in causa universitatis fingatur
una persona.”110 In substance, Sinibaldo theorized that a collegium,
understood as a universitas, could be considered as a person.111 Such
language was so revolutionary that it immediately sparked debates among

101. Maximilian Koessler, The Person in Imagination or Persona Ficta of the Corporation, 9
LA. L. REV. 435, 437 (1949).
102. See Rodriguez, supra note 85, at 306–07.
103. See MELLONI, supra note 84, at 32 (all translations done by the authors).
104. The work of Sinibaldo is widely explained and commented on by the prominent Italian
jurist and historian Francesco Ruffini. FRANCESCO RUFFINI, LA CLASSIFICAZIONE DELLE PERSONE
GIURIDICHE IN SINIBALDO DEI FIESCHI (INNOCENZO 4) 10 (1898) (all translations done by the authors).
105. See Matthew 16:18-19 (New American Bible)
And so I say to you, you are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church, and the gates
of the netherworld shall not prevail against it. I will give you the keys to the kingdom of
heaven. Whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven; and whatever you loose on
earth shall be loosed in heaven.
106. See RUFFINI, supra note 104, at 10.
107. See id. at 16.
108. See Ciepley, supra note 38, at 38.
109. RUFFINI, supra note 104, at 14 (all translations done by the authors).
110. Id. at 11.
111. Id. at 8.
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canon lawyers.112 The debates centered on whether a nonhuman entity
could be labelled as a person and, if so, what ramification that would
entail.113
As a result of this new theory, Sinibaldo systematized the legal
structure of the Church and guaranteed his own jurisdiction over the
ecclesiastical corporations.114 The systematization of ecclesiastic legal
entities not only facilitated the development of corporate law, but also
facilitated the use and diffusion of the corporate form.115
Sinibaldo also clarified that chartering a corporation required a
concession from the sovereign authority of the land, stating that “nobody,
even a free person, has the power to establish a legal person, nor a city or
a municipality without the explicit or unspoken consent of the lawmaker
of the land”.116 In his view, the legal personality of an asset corporation
would depend on a specific act issued by the authority, after assessing that
the corporation’s purpose was lawful and worthwhile.117
Furthermore, Sinibaldo structured his corporate theory according to
two key elements. The first element concerned authority and
representation, and it provided an individual with the power to take an oath
and swear in on behalf of an ecclesiastical corporation (collegium). This
overcame the requirement that all members of the corporation took an oath
and be sworn in. Ultimately, representation by an individual was possible
as “the college is in corporate matters figured as a person.”118 This
suggested that a collegium was imagined as a person. In such a
circumstance, Sinibaldo recommended the corporate form be used as a
legal device to solve practical problems, which involved “the treatment of
a corporation as a separate legal entity.”119
Sinibaldo theorized and regulated legal capacity and systems of
governance for ecclesiastical corporate entities, and he introduced the
concept of a juristic person and its accompanying terminology to refer to
a legal entity.120 According to Sinibaldo’s taxonomy, a corporation is a
112. Id. at 12.
113. Id. This debate is familiar to contemporary constitutional law and corporate law scholars,
especially in light of recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in important cases such as Citizen
United v. FEC and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310,
354 (2010); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 707 (2014).
114. Rodriguez, supra note 85, at 307.
115. RUFFINI, supra note 104, at 11 (all translations done by the authors).
116. The original Latin text reads: “nulli homines, quantumcunque sint liberi, non tamen possunt
constituere universitatem burgi vel villae sine consensu tacita, vel expresso eius, qui ius dicit in illa
terra.” Innocentius IV, supra note 89, at 3, X, De officio ordin. (I, 31), n. 1, folio 92 verso (all
translations done by the authors).
117. RUFFINI, supra note 104, at 10 (discussing the concept of “institution”).
118. Koessler, supra note 101, at 437.
119. Id. at 438.
120. RUFFINI, supra note 104, at 12 (all translations done by the authors).
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legal entity, not a human person.121 In other words, Sinibaldo was aware
of the limits of a legal entity. Because corporations are not humans, the
law could not extend sanctions that presuppose the existence of a human
soul to corporations; for example, collegia could not be sanctioned by
excommunication like a natural person could be.122
The second element addressed the effects of the corporate form. In
particular, Sinibaldo aimed at solving a two-sided task. On one side, he
aimed at distinguishing the Church, which is a sempiternal institution,
from the Christians, who are mortal.123 On the other side, he aimed at
designing a legal entity capable of achieving its religious purpose along
with goals of charity, solidarity, and public assistance.
The corporate form contributed to determine the identity of the
Church itself.124 The corporate form largely insulated the Church from the
ontological control of the emperor. In addition, it constituted an
organizational model for myriads of unrecognized entities. Before
Sinibaldo, the persona ficta itself did not have any existence within the
law.125 Sinibaldo made legal personhood a pillar of public law. This made
the corporate form applicable to a range of ecclesiastic organizations.
Individuals also benefitted from the incorporation theory.126 By
attributing the specific name of “persona ficta” to a number of
ecclesiastical entities, such as churches, monasteries, charitable bodies,
and cathedral chapters, the Church was able to create several types of
corporations, each with its own standardized rules and purposes.127 In turn,
by characterizing its ecclesiastical entities as corporations, the Church was
also able to provide rights recognized by canon law to individuals subject
of ecclesiastical authority. Accordingly, the members of an ecclesiastical
corporation could exercise rights and receive legal protection.128 For
example, the members of the cathedral chapters, known as “canons,” could

121. Id.
122. Rodriguez, supra note 85, at 315–16.
123. Koessler, supra note 101, at 438-439.
124. See Michael Thomas Black, The Theology of the Corporation: Sources and History of the
Corporate Relation in Christian Tradition 119 (October 2009) (Ph.D. thesis, University of Oxford), at
119–20 (arguing that since the Edict of the Emperor Constantine of 313, many theories were put
forward from time to time to modify the idea that the Church had been created by a deed of the
Emperor.) For example, it was surmised that the Church was formed by an act of the Spirit and only
confirmed by the Emperor through his recognition. Id. This allowed the Church to claim equality with
the empire as well as secular sovereignty when the princeps were vacant. Id.
125. RUFFINI, supra note 104, at 11–12 (all translations done by the authors).
126. See AMANDA PORTERFIELD, CORPORATE SPIRIT: RELIGION AND THE RISE OF THE MODERN
CORPORATION 44–46 (2018).
127. RUFFINI, supra note 104, at 12 (all translations done by the authors).
128. PORTERFIELD, supra note 126, at 46.
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seek remedies in ecclesiastical courts.129 Through its corporations, the
Church branched out its jurisdiction beyond its geopolitical boundaries.
To summarize, Sinibaldo’s systematization of corporate entities was
based on four pillars. First, Sinibaldo gave a new name to the different
entities of the Church. Second, Sinibaldo clearly established that the
corporation was a fictitious entity created by the law. Third, Sinibaldo
clarified that legal entities are separate from individuals, including their
members. Fourth, Sinibaldo set limitations on the legal capacity of legal
entities, which did not have the same rights as human beings.
The corporate form is arguably one of the key factors that propelled
the diffusion of Christianity on a global scale. Corporations have been
central in the organization of the Church. They allowed ecclesiastic
institutions to function effectively. Moreover, they allowed the Church to
protect its existence and its activities from the secular power. And they
facilitated the worshipping of God throughout centuries.
While the Church has played a paramount role in forming and
systemizing corporate law, Islamic law has not embraced the corporate
form. Nevertheless, the tension between Islamic law’s resistance to the
corporate form and the solutions that Islamic law jurists have developed
to subtract assets from ownership of human beings and commit them to
religious causes sheds light on the systemic relevance of legal personhood
and asset partitioning. Part II provides an account of the relation between
Islamic law and the corporate form.
II. ISLAMIC LAW, ASSET PARTITIONING, AND MORALS
Classic Islamic law did not recognize corporations as legal entities.130
An organization’s activities and corresponding liabilities affected the
obligations and responsibilities of the involved individuals such as its
members.131 In fact, shielding participants in a business endeavor from the
responsibilities that attain their entrepreneurial activities is inconsistent
with the principles characterizing classical Islamic law and
jurisprudence.132
129. See Mario Ferraboschi, Capitolo, in ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITTO, VI, at 218 (1960) (all
translations done by the authors).
130. “[T]he idea that a company may be considered as a juristic person did not develop among
Muslim scholars until recently under the influence of Western laws.” Nabil Saleh, Arab International
Corporations: The Impact of the Shari’a, 8 ARAB L.Q. 179, 180 (1993); see also Amnon Cohen,
Communal Legal Entities in a Muslim Setting Theory and Practice: The Jewish Community in
Sixteenth-Century Jerusalem, 3 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 75, 75–76 (1996); Timur Kuran, The Absence of
the Corporation in Islamic Law: Origins and Persistence, 53 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 785, 785–815 (2005).
131. Kuran, supra note 130, at 800–15.
132. The current legal scenario is more fragmented as a result of the overlap between Muslim
legal tradition and modern colonial and postcolonial codification systems. Modern Islamic scholars
typically declare that corporations are legal entities in Islamic law by analogizing corporations to other
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Nevertheless, some legal entities with religious or public purposes,
like the māsjid (mosque) and the wāqf, operate in a form that allows them
to achieve asset partitioning, which is arguably the paramount privilege
provided by the corporate form.133 For those who strive to conceptualize
asset partitioning in Islamic law, wāqfs are key institutions to consider. As
Professor Timur Kuran puts it “[a] wāqf is an unincorporated trust
established under Islamic law by a living [person] [(waqīf)] for the
provision of a designated social service in perpetuity.”134
The masjid and the wāqf are founded through the subtraction of
property from ownership of individuals.135 With the act of donation, the
original owners give up ownership rights on their property, which becomes
committed to the sacred or social purpose such as public service,
education, or worship of God.136 These institutions are dedicated to Allah
and meant to survive the death of the founder.137 The governance of these
institutions and of the committed assets is delegated to an individual
administrator or placed under the administration of the Treasury or the
nonhuman entities that are mentioned in Islamic law, such as wāqf. Mahdi Zahraa, Legal Personality
in Islamic Law, 10 ARAB L.Q. 193, 206 (1995).
133. A wāqf is a religiously motivated donation of a property that generates revenues and is
managed and regulated by Islamic law. Mohamed A. ‘Arafa, Islamic Policy of Environmental
Conservation: 1,500 Years Old – Yet Thoroughly Modern, 16 EUR. J.L. REFORM 456, 498–501 (2014).
“According to the Hanfi School of jurisprudential thought, wāqf means ‘the detention of the [c]orpus
from the ownership of any person and the gifts of its income or usufruct either presently or in the
future, to some charitable purpose “in charity of poor or other good objects.”’” Id. at 498 (alteration
in original).
134. Timur Kuran, The Provision of Public Goods Under Islamic Law: Origins, Impact, and
Limitations of the Waqf System, 35 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 841, 842 (2001). In other words,
Wāqf (inalienable properties or properties left in perpetuity) by definition is the act by
which certain properties cease to be a subject of any transaction such as sale, rent,
ownership, or inheritance, or to be used as a deposit (rāhn), or as a gift, provided that their
products, advantages and benefits are devoted as . . . permanent . . . .
Zahraa, supra note 132, at 204 (citing JAMAL J. NASIR, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF PERSONAL STATUS 247
(1986)). Perpetuity is one of the fundamental conditions for the validity of the wāqf and its legal status
posed an intricate juridical problem. In other words, the problem of perpetuity is resolved via the legal
fiction under which the wāqf property is vested in God. Scholars unanimously identified the separation
of the substance and usufruct in wāqf property. Whereas the substance is reserved (either in the
ownership of the founder or God), the usufruct belongs to the beneficiaries. Muhammad Zubair
Abbasi, The Classical Islamic Law of Waqf: A Concise Introduction, 26 ARAB L.Q. 121, 124–26
(2012).
135. See generally Zainal A. Zuryati, Mohamed Yusoff & Ahmad N. Azrae, Separate Legal
Entity Under Syariah Law and Its Application on Islamic Banking in Malaysia: A Note, 6 INT’L J.
BANKING & FIN. 139 (2009) (explaining the legal personality of juristic entities in Malaysia).
136. After the foundation, further acts of endowments were registered in the original deed
(waqfiyya) and kept in the local archives. The waqfiyya established the location and identity of the
property endowed, objectives, amount of money, and other regulations of the endowment. Maya
Shatzmiller, Islamic Institutions and Property Rights: The Case of the ‘Public Good’ Waqf, 44 J.
ECON. & SOC. HIST. ORIENT 44, 48 (2001).
137. ‘Arafa, supra note 133, at 498–501.
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Ministry of Religious Affairs.138 The proceeds of the donated assets are
used to accomplish the mission of the institution; however, the donated
assets remain untouched, similar to a university endowment.
A. Islamic Law and the Contested Corporate Form
Legal personhood and the corporate form are considered Western
concepts, but Islamic law has been assessing their admissibility for a long
time.139 While specialists have voiced an urgent need for more accuracy in
determining the answer, the issue remains unsettled. Nevertheless, Islamic
law and jurisprudence offer significant elements to investigate the nature
and rationales of the corporate form, legal personhood, and asset
partitioning.
1. The Person and Personal Liability Under the Sharie’a
In Sharie’a, the Islamic law, a “person” is defined as someone who
acquires Islamic ethical values (ahkām shari’yā) from God in the form of
rights and duties.140 An individual’s ability to be fit for such rights and
duties is called dhimmāh, which translates to “legal capacity” or “legal
personality.”141 The Egyptian founder of the Civil Code of 1948, Professor
‘Abd-Razzāq al-Sanhūrī, discussed how dhimmāh is a “juristic (shāri’)
description that is presumed by the legislator to exist in a human being
and . . . with which [the person] becomes able to oblige and be obliged.”142

138. Historically, the transfer of ownership was marked by the procedure of foundation
inscription. Thus, before a foundation inscription could be put up on a religious building, its owner,
generally the founder themself, had to relinquish their title to the property in favor of the institution of
their choice. Its waqfiyya had to be drawn up, legalized by the qadis in front of witnesses, and
registered. In Mamluk, Egypt, the building would not have been considered a wāqf unless this
procedure had taken place. Moreover, in the absence of written deeds, the inscription could be relied
upon to solve any litigation pertaining to that building. The stone wall was considered as a part of the
building and likely to be contemporary with it. Leonor Fernandes, Notes on a New Source for the Study
of Religious Architecture During the Mamluk Period: The Waqfīya, 33 AL-ABHATH 3, 4 (1985).
139. See generally Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, Book Review, Islamic Law of Business
Organization Corporations. Islamic Law and Jurisprudence, Volume 2, 12 J. ISLAMIC STUD. 329
(2001) (detailing the legal personhood of the corporation in the Islamic jurisprudence).
140. See generally MAHMOUD A. EL-GAMAL, ISLAMIC FINANCE: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
PRACTICE (2006) (defining the concept of person within Islamic law).
141. For a definition of “legal person,” see Judson A. Crane, Uniform Partnership Act and Legal
Persons, 29 HARV. L. REV. 838, 839 (1916) (“A legal person is an entity treated by the law as the
subject of rights and obligations.”).
142. 4 ‘ABD AL-RAZZĀQ AL-SANHŪRĪ, MASADIR AL-HAQQ FI AL-FIQH AL-ISLAMI: DERASSAH
MOKARNAH BI-ALFIQH ELGARBI 17–20 [THE SOURCES OF RIGHT IN ISLAMIC LAW: A Comparative
Analysis of the Western Jurisprudence], Part I: MOQDIMAH WA SIGHAT AL’AQD [Introduction and
Theory of Contract] (Dar Ihi’a’a al-Turath al-Arabi,1998) (all translations done by the authors).
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Therefore, the full capacity to bear rights and duties is only recognized in
natural persons with sound mind, who have reached the age of maturity.143
“Dhimmāh is also defined as an ‘imaginary container or vessel that
holds both the capacity for acquisition and the capacity for execution.’”144
Therefore, dhimmāh has two components.145 The first component, ahliyāt
al-wujub, refers to the person’s legal capacity to have rights, bear
liabilities, make commitments, and owe duties. Ahliyāt al-wujub exists
ipso facto and ab initio in every living person.146 The second component,
ahliyāt al-ādā’, refers to the person’s capacity to take action in exercising
and executing rights and duties. In other words, ahliyāt al-ādā’ refers to a
person’s agency to conduct their own affairs.147
Although Sharie’a does not allow human beings to charter a
corporation, Muslim scholars developed a legal structure, featuring asset
143. Id. at 736–37 (all translations done by the authors). Inadequate or deficient capacity is
designated to those having some discretion as children younger than seven years or those considered
not of sound mind. See generally Chibli Mallat, Commercial Law in the Middle East: Between
Classical Transactions and Modern Business, 48 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 81 (2000) (explaining the
classical and the modern models of business transactions in the Middle East); Frederick Parker Walton,
The Egyptian Law of Obligations (London 1920) (detailing the rules of obligations in the Egyptian
Civil Code); Zuhair E. Jwaideh, The New Civil Code of Iraq, 22 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 176 (1953)
(explaining rules of obligations in the Iraqi Civil Code). In this regard, the Egyptian Civil Code reads,
Legislative provisions as regards the legal capacity of a person are applicable to all persons
who fulfill the conditions embodied in such provisions.
When a person, who was deemed to possess legal capacity . . . , becomes legally incapable
in accordance with the provisions of a new law, such legal incapacity does not affect the
validity of acts previously done by him.
Law No. 131 of 1948 (Civil Code), Journal du Commerce et de la Marine, 15 Oct., 1949, art. 6
(Egypt).
144. Anowar Zahid, Corporate Personality from an Islamic Perspective, 27 ARAB L.Q. 125, 133
(2013) (quoting IMRAN AHSAN KHAN NYAZEE, THEORY OF ISLAMIC LAW: THE METHODOLOGY OF
IJTIHĀD 75 (2002)); see also Valentino Cattelan, Property (Māl) and Credit Relations in Islamic Law:
An Explanation of Dayn and the Function of Legal Personality (Dhimma), 27 ARAB L.Q. 2, 190–200
(2013) (explaining the concept of debt in the Islamic financial system). From birth to death, a living,
natural human being is deemed an individual under the law if they can hold rights or obligations, and
thus, an enslaved person is not legally considered a person. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t. of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
417 (Mass. 1977). See generally Dan E. Stigall, A Closer Look at Iraqi Property and Tort Law, 68 LA.
L. REV. 8 (2008) (discussing the concept of property and its sources in Iraqi Civil Law).
145. Some argue that dhimmāh is the reason for the application of legal rules (shār’i ahkām). A
natural person becomes a legal person when they possess dhimmāh. See, e.g., Airedale N.H.S. Trust
v. Bland [1993] A.C. 789, 804. See generally Sarah Mirza, Dhimma Agreements and Sanctuary
Systems at Islamic Origins, 77 J. NEAR E. STUD. 99 (2018) (detailing the concept of dhimmāh in the
Islamic system).
146. MUSTAFA AL-SIBA’IE & ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-SABOUNI, AL-AHWĀL AL-SHĀKHSFYYĀH
FI AL-AHLIYYĀH WĀ AL-WASFYYĀH WĀ AL-TARIKĀT [THE PERSONAL STATUS (FAMILY) LAW:
LEGAL CAPACITY, INHERITANCE, AND BEQUESTS] 75–78 (3d ed. Maṭbaʻat Jāmiʻat Dimashq,
Damascus University Press 1970 (1966)) (all translations done by the authors).
147. Id. at 79–80 (all translations done by the authors). Al-Qarāfi defines the term in question
as: “juristic (shari’) meaning presumed in an adult allows obliging and being obliged as well.” Id.
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partitioning, that resembles legal personhood through the dhimmāh
doctrine.148 It is worth noting that legal personhood (dhimmāh) can exist
without the capacity to exercise rights and duties (ahliyāt al-ādā’);
however, legal personhood can never exist without legal capacity to hold
rights and obligations (ahliyāt al-wujub).149 Therefore, dhimmāh is argued
to depend on the capacity to bear rights and obligations (ahliyāt al-wujub),
which means that the paramount aspect of the legal personality is the
capacity to own assets and bear liabilities as an entity that has its own
property.150
To clarify, Sharie’a does not repugn the concept of legal personality,
but classical Islamic law (fiqh) does not provide legal personhood for
corporations.151 Traditional Islamic law does not conceive entities separate
from the natural persons who have a stake in them. According to Islamic
traditional jurisprudence, all the economic activities, including business
and entrepreneurship, are governed by the principle of personal
responsibility.152 This means that entrepreneurs are responsible when
conducting business and need to balance the possibility of profits against
the risks of the contemplated economic activities.153

148. Id. (all translations done by the authors). Dhimmāh was developed in combination with the
legal capacity theory and both policies have been well defined to serve the concept of legal personality
and explain its elements. Id.
149. Id. at 75 (all translations done by the authors).
150. See generally Oussama Arabi, Legal Capacity, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM (Kate Fleet,
Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas & Everett Rowson eds., Brill 2011) (discussing the
concept of legal capacity in Islam). In other words, “Legal capacity (ahliyya), according to classical
Muslim jurists, is of two kinds: capacity of obligation (ahliyyat al-wujūb) and capacity of execution
(ahliyyat al-adāʾ). Capacity of obligation refers to the potential of any human being to possess legal
rights and obligations.” Id. See generally Joseph Schacht, Islamic Religious Law, in THE LEGACY OF
ISLAM 125–26 (Joseph Schacht & C.E. Bosworth eds., 1974) (detailing the concepts of rights and
duties in Islamic jurisprudence). In this regard, Al-Qarāfi defines the term in question as: “juristic
(shari’) meaning presumed in an adult allows obliging and being obliged as well.” See 3 AL-QARAFI,
AL-FURUQ, 226–31 (1998) (all translations done by the authors). In the same vein, Hajj Al-Din AlSabki states that: “Our scholars state that dhimmāh is presumed meaning in an adult allows him to
oblige as well as being obliged and this meaning should make it clear that a human being who is not
wise and adult does not have dhimmāh.” 1 AL-SABKI, AL-ASHBIH WA L-NAZAIR 363–64 (1991) (all
translations done by the authors).
151. Dawoud S. El Alami, Legal Capacity with Specific Reference to the Marriage Contract, 6
ARAB L.Q. 190, 190–92 (1991). See Saleh, supra note 130, at 179–80 (detailing the definition of
corporation in the Islamic and Arab legal systems).
152. See generally Saleh, supra note 130 (discussing the concept of legal personality in Islam).
153. This principle was explicit in the Islamic law but implicit in Canon law. From a Christian
perspective, limited liability was not merely an innovation due to smart lawyers but an instrumental
deviation from ancient doctrines of personal responsibility. See Michael Schluter, Risk, Reward and
Responsibility: Limited Liability and Company Reform, 9 CAMBRIDGE PAPERS 1 (2000) (discussing
the idea of risk and the concept of limited liability). Contra Stephen F. Copp, A Theology of
Incorporation with Limited Liability, 14 J. MKTS. & MORALITY 35 (2011) (discussing limited and
religious law).
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In the case of collective business endeavors, the risks are shared
across the entrepreneurs. So, personal responsibility, both individually and
collectively, governs Islamic regulation of economic matters.154 Personal
responsibility is considered a principle aimed at promoting a just and
cohesive society, while fairly and equitably dealing with the tangible risks
that every economic undertaking involves.155 In the Islamic legal tradition,
business organizations need “risk sharing” rather than models based on
limited liability and asset partitioning. Risk sharing is interpreted as an
effective method to achieve a more stable economic and financial
environment than the conventional Western one.156
Consequently, some Muslim scholars and jurisprudential streams
reject a concept of legal personhood that provides a shield from personal
liability.157 However, neither Qurʼānic verses nor any prophetic Hadīth
(tradition) unequivocally excludes the notion that an entity could have
dhimmāh.158 Hence, one may argue that legal personhood is acceptable in
light of the Islamic jurisprudence principle—developed by the Shāfi’ì
School—that “what is not prohibited is permitted.”159 In addition, whether
the corporate form and the inherent legal personhood are legitimate may
also be answered from another Islamic norm designed, through
jurisprudence, by the Ḥānāfī School.
2. Jurisprudence of the Ḥānāfī School’s Exception
The idea that an entity could have legal capacity did not develop
among Muslim scholars until recently.160 In fact, Muslim scholars have
started considering legal personhood for entities under the influence of

154. See generally Baber Johansen, The Legal Personality (dhimma) and the Concept of
Obligation in Islamic Law (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Divinity School),
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~egcenter/Johansen_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TEY-GN4K] (discussing
the concept of Dhimma in Islam).
155. Id.
156. HOSSEIN ASKARI, ZAMIR IQBAL & ABBAS MIRAKHOR, INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC
ECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATION 190 (2015).
157. See generally Sarah Mirza, Dhimma Agreements and Sanctuary Systems at Islamic Origins,
77 J. NEAR E. STUD. 99 (2018) (discussing the concept of legal personhood in Islam).
158. Zuryati, Yusoff & Azrae, supra note 135, at 7–10.
159. See generally RECEP DOGA, USUL AL-FIQH: METHODOLOGY OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE
(2015) (defining the sources of Islamic law).
160. For further details on the legal capacity (especially to juristic legal persons) in Islamic law,
see Mohammad N. Omar, The Concept of Impediments to Legal Capacity (‘Awārid al-Ahliyyah), in
ISLAMIC LAW OF CONTRACT AND THE EGYPTIAN CIVIL CODE OF 1948, at 23–30 (2006) (Ph.D. Thesis,
University of Wales). See also Copp, supra note 153 (discussing the legal capacity notion in sacred
law).
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Western laws and traditions. 161 As a result of colonialism, Islamic scholars
have been divided over the issue of legal personhood for corporations.162
The scholars in the Ḥānāfī school of jurisprudence, which represents
the most moderate school of Islamic interpretation, try to adopt an indirect
rationale to admit legal personality for nonhuman entities under Islamic
law.163 They argue that everything is permitted unless prohibited or
forbidden by the Sharie’a and its main principles.164 Permissibility is first
sought through clear proofs found in the primary sources, which are the
Qur’ān and the Prophet Mohammad’s teaching (Sunnah).165 If there is no
161. Syed S. Hamid, Influence of Western Jurisprudence over Islamic Jurisprudence: A
Comparative Study, 4 NORTHERN UNIV. J. L. 13, 16–17 (2013).
There is no acceptable reason to accuse any non-Muslim law or economic system of
lacking ethical or ideological content, because all social sciences are based on hidden value
judgments which reflect the traditions, ethics and ideals of the man who formulated them.
Western jurisprudence is not an exception to this rule as can be easily seen in the following
words written by one of its scholars. There is no wonder if legal systems differ from one
another because of differences in national values. And for this reason, . . . that we should
not expect different Muslim nations to have one and the same legal or economic system
even if they exert the same afford to comply with the Qur’an and tradition. But, because
all Muslims resort to the same legal resources, we expect their legal systems to have a great
deal in common. Likewise, Western legal systems resemble one another; but differ greatly
from Islamic ones, because each group has its own origin.
Id. Schacht, supra note 150, at 398; see also NABIL A. SALEH, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SAUDI
ARABIAN AND OMANI COMPANY LAWS (STATUTES AND SHARI’A) 79–80 (1981); Ponce v. Roman
Cath. Apostolic Church, 210 U.S. 296, 323–24 (1908). In this regard, the United States Supreme Court
has stated,
[t]he Roman Catholic Church has been recognized as having legal personality by the Treaty
of Paris, and its property rights solemnly safeguarded. In so doing the treaty has merely
followed the recognized rule of international law which would have protected the property
of the church in Porto Rico subsequent to the cession. This juristic personality and the
church’s ownership of property had been recognized in the most formal way by the
concordats between Spain and the papacy, and by the Spanish laws from the beginning of
settlements in the Indies. Such recognition has also been accorded the church by all systems
of European law from the fourth century of the Christian era.
Id; see generally Cihan Artunç, Legal Origins of Corporate Governance: Choice of Company Law in
Egypt, 1887–1913, YOUTUBE (June 25, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pTvXyw8YeBY
[https://perma.cc/HT6Z-VYC4] (discussing the history of corporations in Egyptian Law).
162. See, e.g., Frank E. Vogel, Contract Law of Islam and the Arab Middle East, in VII
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: CONTRACTS IN GENERAL 27 (2006); James
N.D. Anderson, Islamic Law and Structural Variations in Property Law, in II INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 103 (1975).
163. RAJ BHALA, UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW: SHARĪʻA 302–09 (2016).
164. Id. at 305–07.
165. Mohamed A. ‘Arafa, Case 8/1996 (Egypt), in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7–10 (Rüdiger Wolfrum, Frauke Lachenmann & Rainer Grote
eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2018)
On the other hand, both a Qur’ānic text and a Prophet’s saying could hold multiple
meanings, allowing for numerous interpretations. Accordingly, the Court held that a law
that undermines justice and the common good would be unconstitutional. The SCC
perspective on Article 2 reveals that it adopts the theory of siyāssā shāri’yyā, which means
that the system of governance should be consistent with Islamic law, but with some “smart”
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proof in the primary sources, scholars look to secondary sources, such as
analogical deduction, juristic preference, consensus of Islamic jurists
(ijm’ā), jurisprudential doctrines, and presumption of continuity.166
For instance, the jurisprudential doctrine of public interest (maslāhāh
mursālāh) provides that a state can make any laws that pursue public
interest insofar as they are not prohibited by the primary sources.167 To
apply the doctrine of public interest, the following conditions must be
satisfied.168 First, there must be a need to secure a benefit or to prevent
harm for the people in general. Second, there must be no clear provision
(hukm) in the Qur’ān, in the Prophet Mohammad’s teaching (Sunnah), or
in the consensus of Islamic jurists (ijm’ā).169 Third, it must be essential to
serve a common good (maslāhāh), such as economic progress.170 Fourth,
the pursued common good (maslāhāh) shall not conflict with any Islamic
principle, such as the prohibition to seek interests (ribā) or take excessive
risk (ghārār).171 Fifth, the common good (maslahah) shall be rational and
acceptable to people of sound mind. Sixth, and finally, this method shall
not apply to matters of worship (‘ibādāt).172
reform. So, the Court’s position could be summed up in two criteria: that a law must meet
to be consistent with Article 2; and that there should be uniformity with authentic Islamic
rules and upholding the purposes of Islamic law. The Court did not consider the claim that
the theory of siyāssa shāri’yyā only allows religious clerics and guilds to interpret Sharie’a.
Instead, it regarded itself as able to use ijtihād whenever the need arose.
Id. Ḥānāfī is one of four moderate Islamic Sunni schools of jurisprudential thought which include
Shāfi’ì, Mālikī, and Hānbālī. Id.
166. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni & Gamal M. Badr, The Shari’ah: Sources,
Interpretation, and Rule-Making, 1 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 135 (2002) (defining the primary
sources of Islamic law and detailing Islamic schools of thought).
167. Maslāhāh has three categories: darorriyāt (essentials), hajiyāt (needs), and tahsiniyāt
(embellishments). In the absence of any obvious evidence from the Qur’ān and Sunnah, corporate
personality may be recognized from a māslāhāh perspective. See generally M. HASHIM KAMALI,
PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 238 (3d ed. 2003) (explaining the concept of Maslāhāh in
Islam).
168. Id. See generally Khizr Muazzam Khan, Juristic Classification of Islamic Law, 6 HOUS. J.
INT’L L. 23 (1983) (defining the primary and the secondary sources of Islamic law).
169. Id.; Nazeem M. Goolam, Ijtihad and Its Significance for Islamic Legal Interpretation, 2006
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1443, 1444–46.
170. Irshad Abdal-Haqq, Islamic Law: An Overview of its Origin and Elements, 7 J. ISLAMIC L.
& CULTURE 1, 27, 57 (2002) (noting the different sources of Islamic law and the meaning of the public
interest’s interpretation).
171. See generally NABIL A. SALEH, UNLAWFUL GAIN AND LEGITIMATE PROFIT IN ISLAMIC
LAW: RIBA, GHARAR AND ISLAMIC BANKING (Cambridge Univ. Press 1986) (providing details on the
practical concern for all the parties involved in international trade between Western and Muslim
countries as well as discussing the contemporary debate on risk and profit in the Islamic context).
172. See generally SA’ĪD AL’ASHMĀWĪ, AL-SHARĪ’A AL-ISLĀMIYYA WA-L-QĀNŪN AL-MISRĪ
[ISLAMIC LAW AND EGYPTIAN LAW] (1996) (discussing comparative approaches to Islamic business
transactions); TĀRIQ AL-BISHRĪ, AL-WAD’ AL-QĀNŪNĪ AL-MU’ĀSIR BAYN AL-SHARĪ’A ALISLĀMIYYA WA-L-QĀNŪN AL-WAD’Ī [THE LEGAL STATUS QUO: BETWEEN ISLAMIC LAW AND
POSITIVE LAW] (Dar Al-Shrouq, 1st ed. 1996) discussing commercial transactions in Civil Law).
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From the maslāhāh mursālāh doctrine, it is clear that under Islamic
law, the interests of the Muslim community, including public and religious
interests, take precedence over the private interests of individuals.173 In
fact, “priority is given to preserving the universal interest over particular
interest,” which means prioritizing the public interest over private
interests.174 In furtherance of this principle, some Muslim scholars apply
the dhimmāh doctrine to Islamic entities such as the wāqf, the māsjid
(mosque), and beit al-māl (public treasury).175
B. Islamic Entities and Purpose as a Determinant
Some contemporary Muslim scholars recognize the legal personhood
of certain institutions, based on their intrinsic social or religious value, as
long as they are compatible with Islamic norms and principles.176 To be
compatible with Islamic norms and principles, an institution must have an
effective capacity to fulfill religious duties, such as the payment of zākāh
(mandatory financial donation).177 Therefore, according to these
contemporary Muslim scholars, institutions such as schools, orphanages,
hospitals, mosques, and charitable institutions can be recognized legal
personhood.
1. The Mosque’s Legal Personality
The debate on mosques’ legal personhood has been dynamic over
time. Jumā Mosque Congregation of Baku v. Azerbaijan is a landmark
case about religious communities’ autonomy—the right of religious
173. ‘Arafa, supra note 133, at 494.
174. ‘Id. (citing TAQI AD-DIN AHMAD IBN TAYMIYYAH, AL-SIYASAH AL-SHAR’IYAH FI ISLAH
AR-RA’I WAR-RA’IYAH [THE POLITICAL RULES IN ASSESSING THE RULER AND THE RULED BY]
(Arabic Book Review, 2008)) (all translations done by the authors).
Social interests and public benefits are addressed according to their significance,
actuality[,] and certainty in this regard. Islamic law classifies interests into (a) daruriyat
(necessities), or those things indispensable to the preservation of the Al-adaruriat Al-khams
(five Sharie’a objectives of life, religion, lineage, property, and prosperity); (b) hajiyat
(needs), meaning those things whose absence leads to actual hardship and suffering; and
(c) tahsinyyat (supplementary benefits), which means things that refine life and enhance
ethical values.
Id.
175. Dhimmāh is the capability, a qualification, whereas capacity is the exercise of that
capability, in which the person should have the degree of reason and awareness to receive such
capability. Johansen, supra note 154.
176. Robert L. Raymond, Genesis of the Corporation, 19 HARV. L. REV. 350, 350 (1906). See
generally Stanley N. Katz, Legal Personality in Islamic Law, THE OXFORD INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL HISTORY (Oxford Univ. Press 2009) (discussing legal personhood in the
Islamic context).
177. See generally IMRAN AHSAN KHAN NYAZEE, ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE: USUL AL-FIQH (3d
ed. 2016) (providing the foundation for any meaningful study of Islamic law).
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groups—to organize themselves as they see fit.178 This right includes the
ability of houses of worship to choose their leaders without government
interference.179 In 1937, the Jumā (Friday) Mosque was closed to the
public.180 Under the Soviet Government, the mosque was converted into a
carpet museum; later, a group of Muslims who took possession of the
former mosque converted it into a new local community center.181 In 1992,
following a formal request by that community, the Sabail District
Executive Authority (SDEA) allowed the establishment of the Jumā
Mosque Congregation as a religious organization and recommended that
the Justice Department register it as a legal entity; a religious entity
capable of acquiring and enjoying rights and bearing legal obligations.182
The mosque thereby acquired legal capacity.183 Nobody could own the
mosque, which belonged to God, and it consequentially achieved
perpetual life because its owner is eternal and could own it forever.184
However, there was still uncertainty about whether the mosque
(masjid) may be classified as a juristic person. In Māsjid Shahid Ganj v.
Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, the Bombay High Court
determined “a mosque . . . [to be] a juristic person.”185 The court ruled that
the ruined building was a mosque in which all Muslims had a right to

178. Jumā Mosque Congregation v. Azerbaijan (admissibility) (15405/04), 57 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2013); see, e.g., Amnon Cohen, Communal Legal Entities in a Muslim Setting Theory and Practice
the Jewish Community in Sixteenth-Century Jerusalem, 3 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 75, 75–77, 90 (1996).
See generally Fazal Tanweer, The Mosque as Juristic Person: Law, Public Order and Inter-religious
Disputes in India, 10 S. ASIAN HIST. & CULTURE J. 199 (2019).
179. Jumā Mosque Congregation v. Azerbaijan (admissibility) (15405/04), 57 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2013). Jumā Mosque, “Friday Mosque,” was used as a Muslim house of worship until Azerbaijan
became part of the Soviet Union.
180. Id., see also Ryan Colby, Azerbaijan Mosque Loses Eight-Year Struggle for Religious
Freedom: European Court of Human Rights Allows Azerbaijan Government to Stop Mosque Worship
and Take Building, BECKET L. (Feb. 11, 2013), https://www.becketlaw.org/media/azerbaijan-mosqueloses-eight-year-struggle-religious-freedom/ [https://perma.cc/4TWN-KR6R].
181. Jumā Mosque Congregation v. Azerbaijan (admissibility) (15405/04), 57 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2013).
182. Id.; see also Sehajdhari Sikh Federation v. Union of India & Ors., (2011) CWP No. 17771
(India); Gurleen Kaur and Others v. State of Punjab & Ors. 2009(3) RCR (Civil) 324 on 30.05.2009;
Rajnarain Singh v. Chairman, Patna Administration Committee, Patna & Anr., AIR 1954 SC 569
(ruling that “the modification of the whole cannot be permitted to effect any essential change in the
Act or an alteration in its policy, so also a modification of a part cannot be permitted to do that either”).
183. Jumā Mosque Congregation, 57 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 12–13.
184. It is generally agreed that no one can own a mosque because Allāh Himself owns it;
ownership of a mosque would imply ownership of the owner, which is impossible. Halyani Hassan,
Zuhairah Ariff Abd Ghadas & Nasarudin Abdul Rahman, The Myth of Corporate Personality: A
Comparative Legal Analysis of the Doctrine of Corporate Personality of Malaysian and Islamic Laws,
6 AUSTRALIAN J. BASIC & APPLIED SCIS. 191, 195 (2012).
185. Māsjid Shahid Ganj v. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, (1940) 42 BOMLR
1100 (India); Jumā Mosque Congregation, 57 Eur. Ct. H.R.; see also Colby, supra note 180.
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worship.186 The plaintiffs requested an injunction to restrain any improper
use of the building and a mandatory injunction to reconstruct the
building.187 This lawsuit was motivated by the notion that if the mosque
could be labeled a “juristic person,” this would establish that a mosque
remains a mosque forever and that adverse possession cannot be
applied.188 However, Indian courts rejected that mosques had legal
personhood in other decisions.189
2. A Wāqf’s As a Legal Person
A wāqf, and especially a wāqf al-khairi (which is the religious
foundation in the public interest), depends on the fulfilment of two
mandates.190 The first mandate is legal in nature and involves subtracting
assets from human beings’ ownership. This requires transferring the assets
under the control of an administrator.191 The second is economic in nature
and consists in guaranteeing a loyal, lawful, and fruitful use of the wāqf
property.192
186. See Dhananjay Mahapatra, Ayodhya Verdict’s Link to Lahore’s Shahid Ganj Mosque
Demolition Through 80-yr-old Privy Council Ruling, TIMES OF INDIA, (Nov. 22, 2019),
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/ayodhya-verdicts-link-to-lahores-shahid-ganj-mosquedemolition-through-80-yr-old-privy-council-ruling/articleshow/72184906.cms
[https://perma.cc/R9K6-VZ5G] (“In denying juristic person status to Ram Janmasthan, the Supreme
Court’s Ayodhya land dispute verdict relied on a 1940 Privy Council judgment that had dealt with a
Sikh-Muslim ownership dispute leading to demolition of Shahid Ganj mosque in Lahore . . . . while
dealing with a petition filed on behalf of Masjid Shahid Ganj seeking a declaration that the mosque
and its adjoining properties were a juristic person.”) Id.
187. Hassan, Abd Ghadas, & Abdul Rahman, supra note 184, at 194–98.
188. Id. See generally Muhammad Zubair Abbasi, Sharī’a Under the English Legal System in
British India: Awqāf (Endowments) in the Making of Anglo-Muhammadan Law (2013) (PhD. thesis,
(Oxford University) (discussing the notion of wāqf in the British and Indian legal systems).
189. Māsjid Shahid Ganj v. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, 42 BOMLR 1100;
see also Rajnarain Singh v. Chairman, Patna Administration Committee, Patna & Anr., (1954) AIR
1954 SC 56. It should be noted that the Lahore High Court had accepted the mosque as a juristic person
in many earlier decisions, which the Privy Council swept aside by saying that those decisions are
limited to Punjab alone while there was no authority from any High Court on the other side, as
Rajasthan and Mādrās High Courts. Id. at 8 (citing Shankar Das v. Said Ahmad (1884) 153 PR 59
1914; Maula Bux v. Hafizuddin (1926) 13 AIR Lah 372 AIR 1926 Lah 372.6).
190. See Orsolya Falus, Piae Causae Foundations, Waqfs, Trusts. Legal-Historical Interactions,
16
POLGÁRI SZEMLE 353,
355
(2020),
https://polgariszemle.hu/aktualis-szam/185muhelytanulmanyok/1128-piae-causae-foundations-waqfs-trusts-legal-historical-interactions
[https://perma.cc/7MEE-CNZU] (discussing that the wāqf and the pious foundations also share
another similarity: both limited the circle of beneficiaries to the descendants of the donor). The wāqf
ahli is a family foundation in support of the donor’s descendants; the wāqf khairi is a charitable
foundation for the benefit of everybody. Id.
191. For a historical example of wāqf foundation, see LEONOR FERNANDES, THE FOUNDATION
OF BAYBARS AL-JASHANKIR: ITS WAQF, HISTORY, AND ARCHITECTURE 21, 24–28 (1987) (discussing
that in order to ensure the proper functioning of the wāqf, the founder introduces a clause stipulating
the yearly reading of the wāqfiyya in the presence of the personnel of the complex, followed by the
attestation of witnesses).
192. Shatzmiller, supra note 136, at 69.
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After the waqīf (founder) establishes the wāqf, the wāqf property
stands separate from the waqīf’s assets; therefore, the waqīf loses
ownership rights over the wāqf’s property.193 While the waqīf may be
appointed as mutawalli (trustee) of the wāqf’ and re-gain control over the
wāqf property, as a mutawalli, they would manage the wāqf property and
act in the interest and for the benefit of the beneficiaries.194 All the
mutāwālli’s authorities, rights, and contractual obligations are intended for
this purpose.195 The actions of a mutāwālli affect the separate patrimony
of the wāqf, not the personal patrimony of the mutāwālli, unless a
mutāwālli’s action (or inaction) leads to their personal liability.196 For
example, a mutāwālli can take on loans on behalf of the wāqf, when
appropriate, without incurring any personal liability for the repayment.197
Hence, a wāqf stands separate and independent from the waqīf and the
mutawalli, and survives the death of the waqīf and the mutāwālli.198

193. See Zahraa, supra note 132, at 205 (“Such a juristic dhimma is a restricted concept to the
extent that it enables the administrators of such entities to implement their functions and perform their
office.”).
194. Id. The rights and responsibilities carried out by an administrator also survive through
transition of administrators, which indicates that the rights and responsibilities are truly held by the
wāqf or māsjid as a distinct legal entity with its own dhimmāh rather than held within the dhimmāh of
the administrator. Id. If an administrator hires a service to clean the carpet of a mosque but is dismissed
before they pay it, it does not remain the responsibility of the administrator to pay for the carpet
service—it becomes the responsibility of the new administrator. Id.
195. Haitam Suleiman, The Islamic Trust Waqf: A Stagnant or Reviving Legal Institution?, 4
ELEC. J. ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E.L. 27, 36–39 (2016). He argued,
Similarly to the modern corporation, the waqf was acknowledged in Islamic law as a
‘juristic person’, referred to as thema [dhimmāh]. The concept of waqf points towards an
Islamic system that recognizes the significance of the non-profit sector in social and
economic development. The fiqih of waqf, through Shari’a law, also offers the required
legal and institutional protection to allow this sector the freedom to function separately
from self-interest motives and the power of government.
Id. at 28.; see also SIRAJ SAIT & HILARY LIM, LAND, LAW AND ISLAM: PROPERTY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 147 (2006). Haitam Suleiman & Robert Home, God Is an Absentee,
Too: The Treatment of Waqf (Islamic Trust) Land in Israel/Palestine, 41 J. LEGAL PLURALISM &
UNOFFICIAL L. 49 (2009).
196. In the classical Islamic Fiqh (law), it has been argued by Professor Mustafa al-Zarqā (1904–
1999) that, for example, a qādi (judge) who has been appointed a mutāwālli of wāqf can decide a case
concerning that wāqf unless it has been made in the judge’s favor (as a beneficiary). See Timur Kuran,
The Absence of the Corporation in Islamic Law: Origins and Persistence, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 785,
822–23 (2005).
197. Timur Kuran, The Provision of Public Goods Under Islamic Law: Origins, Impact, and
Limitations, 35 L. & SOC’Y REV. 841, 842 (2001). It has been argued that “[t]he proof of loan against
the waqf stands without the intervention of the responsibility of the trustee.” HUSSAIN MOHI-UD-DIN
QADRI & NASIR IQBAL, ISLAMIC FINANCIAL CONTRACTS: A RESEARCH COMPANION § 3.4 (2021).
198. Yet, a wāqf shall not fail because there is no mutawalli appointed because of the principle
that no trust shall fail for want of a trustee. Zahraa, supra note 132, at 205 (“Otherwise, such entities
will find immense obstacles in performing their rights and duties and become de facto redundant.”)
Id.
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The moderate Hānāfī School stated that “a property purchased with
wāqf’s money does not form a part of it, rather it becomes its property . . .,
[and the] money donated to a mosque belongs to its proprietorship and
does not merge with the mosque itself, as a wāqf.”199 Hence, a wāqf can
own assets, buy and sell, borrow and lend as well as sue and be sued.200
However, the wāqf itself is not a fully-fledged legal person. Typically, a
wāqf is based on ownership vested in Almighty Allāh (God), who is the
owner of the universe, including of wāqf and any additional assets bought
for the wāqf.201
It is worth mentioning that the nature of a wāqf has been discussed
both in judgments and in academia, sometimes adopting conflicting
interpretations.202 For example, in All India Imām Organization v. Union
of India, the Supreme Court of India treated the Imāms as the employees
of the mosque, which was recognized as an entity.203 The decision also
ruled that wāqf boards are responsible for the payment of Imāms’ salaries
on the premise that wāqfs are run by boards in India.204
Such an interpretation of the nature of wāqfs as entities deviates from
the common understanding of wāqfs’ nature as legal devices based on

199. YAWER QAZALBASH, PRINCIPLES OF MUSLIM LAW 309–19 (2003).
200. MUHAMMAD TAQĪ USMANĪ, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC FINANCE 105 (2002). Just as
a wāqf has rights, a wāqf has duties under Sharie’a; for example, an institute is an employee of the
wāqf and eligible to remuneration out of the wāqf’s income. Id.
201. Zahraa, supra note 132, at 205 (“The properties of the wāqf and other charitable
institute[ions] are now so large that almost all Islamic countries have to establish a ministry called the
waqf Ministry (wāzārāt al’wāqāf).”).
202. See Monica M. Gaudiosi, The Influence of the Islamic Law of Waqf on the Development of
the Trust in England: The Case of Merton College, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1231 (1988) (discussing the
linkage between wāqfs and corporations in Islam).
203. All India Imām Organization v. Union of India And Ors, (1993) AIR 2086, SCR (3) 742.
204. Id. See Paul Stibbard, David Russell, QC & Blake Bromley, Understanding the Waqf in the
World of the Trust, 18 TRS. & TRS. 785, 801 (2012) (“[M]atters of administration are dealt with by the
religious authorities or state-controlled boards, whose conduct of their affairs is the subject of some
controversy.). The difficulty will be to guarantee that the religious (or other charitable) aspects satisfy
the needs of both Islamic jurisprudence and the concept of appropriate religious or charitable activity
being entirely charitable under the law of the jurisdiction concerned. In this regard, it should be noted
that the Court held:
By Section 15 of the Wāqf Act, the wāqf Board is vested not only with supervisory and
administrative powers over the wāqf but even the financial power vests in it. One of the
primary duties is to ensure that the income from the wāqf spent on carrying out the purposes
for which the wāqf was created. Mosques are wāqf and are required to be registered under
the Act, over which the Board exercises control. Purpose of their creation is community
worship. The principal functionary to undertake it is the Imām. It is the responsibility of
the wāqf Board to ensure proper maintenance of religious service in a mosque. To say,
therefore, that the Board has no control over the mosque or imām is not correct.
See MOHAMMAD NASEEM & SAMAN NASEEM, RELIGION AND LAW IN INDIA ¶¶ 246–47 (2020). See
also, e.g., Narendra Subramanian, Legal Change and Gender Inequality: Changes in Muslim Family
Law in India, 33 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 631 (2008) (discussing the gender inequality in India).
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ownership vested in Allāh (God).205 More aligned with the general
interpretation of wāqfs’ nature is the view of the Majlis ‘Ulamaˆ, scholars
(fuqah’a) from South Africa, who conclude that a wāqf is not a legal
person because Sharie’a does not recognize legal entities.206 Rather a wāqf
is an organizational model based on ownership vested in Almighty Allāh
(God), who is the owner of the universe.207
For practical necessity, a stream of Islamic law jurisprudence accepts
that wāqfs can possess dhimmāh.208 So, wāqfs can carry out both religious
(God’s worship) and secular (business transactions) obligations. More
generally, as wāqfs can retain financial rights and carry out duties, some
scholars recognize their legal capacity.209
205. Gaudiosi, supra note 202, at 1233.
206. See, e.g., Malik M. Hafeez, An Analysis of Corporate Governance in Islamic and Western
Perspectives, 2 INT’L J. BUS., ECON. & L. 3, 102 (2016). One criticism that may be raised about the
property endowment of commercial businesses is the departure from the object. In corporations, the
company must stick by its object and though the company is the owner of its properties, the domain
of the ownership and the capacity of the company is limited to its object expressed in the statute (the
operations and activities of trade and commerce), which is predicted in the law and cannot exceed its
limits but to implement and accomplish the company’s goals and carry out its policies. Id.
207. Zahraa, supra note 132, at 205 (“The properties of the wāqf and other charitable institutes
are now so large that almost all Islamic countries have to establish a ministry called the waqf Ministry
(wāzārāt al’wāqāf).”). See generally ‘Arafa, supra note 133, at 470.
208. See generally PETER HENNIGAN, THE BIRTH OF A LEGAL INSTITUTION: THE FORMATION
OF THE WAQF IN THIRD-CENTURY A.H. HANAFI LEGAL DISCOURSE (2004) (discussing the role of
Islamic institutions in business); Jeffery Schoenblum, The Role of Legal Doctrine in the Decline of the
Islamic Waqf: A Comparison with the Trust, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1191 (1999) (discussing the
concept of trust in Islam); Henry Cattan, The Law of Waqf, in LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST 203, 212–18
(1955). David S. Powers, The Islamic Family Endowment (waqf), 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1167
(1999) (discussing inheritance law in Islam). ‘Arafa argues that
Waqf is subject to the supervision and control of governmental institutions, where
ministries and public offices were established in Muslim nations to regulate and govern the
waqf properties . . . . In this regard, Muslim Ulmma (jurists) classified waqf as follows:
waqf da’eym (permanent waqf, which lasts as long as the possessions last and is productive)
and waqf mo’aakat (temporary waqf, which occurs for a limited period). Accordingly, waqf
can be: (a) self waqf (for the waqīf’s benefit); (b) waqf ahli (for the relatives’ or family’s
welfare); (c) waqf khairi (for the benefit of the community’s public interest)[;] and (d) waqf
moktalat (mixed grant) (for the benefit of self, the public and/or relatives). In charitable
waqf, the earnings and usufruct are devoted to generous purposes that may be defined by
the waqf statement, in which the Qadi (judge) has the right to designate these goals
according to society’s needs. On the basis of the background of the advisors, the benefactor
may decide to offer his waqf for the general welfare to improve upon goals such as
educational needs, construction of worship places or for service to the elderly. Moreover,
if the consultant has experience with environmental issues and is able to persuade and
encourage the waqīf that environmental safety is vital and necessary for a clean and healthy
environment, the donor may well be inspired to attain that purpose. The benevolent waqf
can result in three conservational circumstances.
‘Arafa, supra note 133, at 498–99.
209. In this regard, the well-known Islamic law scholar Professor ‘Abdul Qādir ‘Audāh argues
that the Islamic law has, since its dawn, recognized the existence of juristic persons. Jurists have
referred to the state treasury and wāqfs as juristic persons. Similarly, jurists have considered schools,
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3. The Islamic Business Corporation Conundrum
Today, in post-colonial Islamic law, a business corporation is
considered an entity like the state or a wāqf.210 However, Islamic business
corporation entities differ from the state or a wāqf, because they do not
enjoy the same level of capacity to bear rights and obligations (ahliyāt alwujub).211 So, the question about legal personality should be viewed from
the perspective of functionality, placing emphasis on a wāqf’s ahliāt
(capacity) to hold and exercise rights and duties. Since the state, wāqfs,
and business corporations have ahliāt, some would argue that business
corporations have dhimmāh.212
The theory of dhimmāh for business corporations has been accepted
by parts of the Muslim world, especially in those countries that base their
regulations on Islamic law more than on Western laws, such as Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Qatar.213 These
nations acknowledge the concept of legal personality for non-human
entities. Classic Islamic specialists, using institutions such as wāqfs,
charitable institutions, and other Islamic foundations, provide adequate
case law to serve as a basis for that theory. Dhimmāh—in the Islamic
context—represents the key issue of determining the legal rights and
obligations of a mukāllāf (competent person).214 It is predominantly
devoted to human beings who are bestowed with the faculty of awareness.
However, it may be recognized to legal entities such as business
corporations since there is no obvious proscription in the Qur’ān or
Sunnah, when a number of criteria are met. Nevertheless, some scholars
worry that legal personhood for business corporations leads to limited

orphanages, hospitals, etc. as juristic persons, able to hold and exercise rights. Professor ‘Abdul Qādir
‘Audāh also explained that legal persons have been recognized in Islamic law since decades; the
Islamic fiqh (jurisprudence) has considered bayt al-māl [State’s budget] as the main model along with
the waqf, but also considered as legal persons schools, shelters, hospitals, etc., and made these entities
able to possess “and dispose of rights and do all other acts in that capacity . . . .” However, the Islamic
fiqh has not recognized criminal liability to these legal persons, since criminal liability is based on free
will (intent or mens rea) perception and choice, none of which exists in these entities. See Shafiq ur
Rahman, Appraisal of Some Scholastic Views on Juridical Personality with Reference to Islamic
Banking Companies, 6 J. ISLAMIC BUS. & MGMT. 97, 105–06 (2016).
210. Zahraa, supra note 132, at 206 (“[E]xamples of such companies . . . and contract companies
including . . . Companies Based on Capital and Companies Based on the Reputation of one of the
Partners.”).
211. Id. See generally Dawoud S. El Alami, Legal Capacity with Specific Reference to the
Marriage Contract, 6 ARAB L.Q. 190 (1991) (detailing the concept of legal capacity in the marriage
concept in Islam).
212. See El Alami, supra note 211.
213. See generally SALEH, supra note 161 (discussing Islamic corporate law in Middle Eastern
legal systems).
214. Id.
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liability for shareholders, which appears in contrast with Sharie’a’s values
and principles of personal responsibility.215
Despite jurisprudential streams that allow entities to have legal
capacity when a number of criteria are met, Islamic law jurists are left with
an unsettled matter. Islamic rulings on legal personhood may vary as the
needs of society change. As Nyazee wrote:
The truth is that the concept of a fictitious person can only operate
within the flexible sphere of the law [. . .] The fixed part of the law
does not need this concept and will reject it. If this concept is thrust
upon the fixed part, a number of inconsistencies may develop in the
law. The case of flexible sphere is different. The imãm (head of the
State or the State) can introduce the concept of juristic person within
the flexible sphere, but this should not affect the law operative in the
fixed part.216

Ultimately, legal personhood in Islamic law could be understood as
a fluid achievement of the fiqh process (jurisprudence).217 It is not an
institution solidified in statutory law. As such, legal personhood in Islamic
law is contingent on society’s interest and need to uphold it. The constant
assessment of society’s interest in legal personhood is extraneous to
Western legal traditions, but it appears as a powerful tool to regularly
check the tradeoff between societal benefits and societal costs, including
externalities, that the corporate form generates.
After a journey in Islamic law to highlight the relevance of purpose
for the corporate form, the next Part of the Article surveys two
fundamental ecclesiastic institutions, the monastery and the cathedral.
Monasteries and cathedrals are structured in the corporate form.218 An
analysis of their structure and features sheds light on attributes of modern,
secular corporations, including business corporations.
III. THE MONASTERY AND THE CATHEDRAL
Besides theorizing and systematizing corporations, the Church has
also made masterful use of corporations. The Church has used the
corporate form to establish, build, and run cathedrals and monasteries.
Notoriously, building a cathedral can span multiple generations. The
215. See generally Ayman Daher, The Shar’ia: Is Roman Law Wearing an Islamic Veil?, 3
HIRUNDO: MCGILL J. CLASSICAL STUD. 95 (2005) (discussing the comparison between the corporate
model in Islam and Roman Law).
216. Zahid, supra note 144, at 149 (quoting NYAZEE, supra note 144, at 78) (alteration in
original).
217. Id.
218. This Article distinguishes between the origins of the corporate form and those of a
substantial body of laws regulating and governing corporate entities, which could be attributed to
Sinibaldo de’ Fieschi and more generally to the Church.
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corporate form, with its organizational structure, has provided a solution
to that. It has also allowed monasteries to own assets, and monks to obey
their poverty vows.
Monasteries are often corporations.219 They can exist in perpetuity;
own rare books and artwork; and survive the departure of monks, friars,
and abbots. While monks are poor, monasteries can own invaluable
assets.220 Monastic law, like corporate law, regulates the relationships
among monks and between monks and the abbot.221 Famous cathedrals
such as the Cathedral of Milan, also known as the Duomo of Milan, rely
on the corporate form. Cathedrals typically have three institutional
dimensions: the building (the cathedral); the legal entity in charge of the
construction and maintenance (the fabrica); and the legal entity overseeing
the religious, cultural, social, and charitable activities (the chapter or, in
Latin, “capitulum”).222 Both monasteries and cathedrals pursue the
purpose to worship God in perpetuity and, like modern corporations, adopt
organizational forms that allow them to survive transient individuals.
A. Monasteries and the Corporate Form
By the eleventh and twelfth centuries, a great number of monasteries
spread across Europe. These institutions represented the large variety of
religious orders, which were animating the religious life at that time.223
Among them, the Benedictines were the oldest and most organized. The
order was founded in Italy by Saint Benedict of Norcia, in the sixth
century.
According to Benedictine principles, the members of a monastic
community were considered united, based on the hierarchic
interdependence of the single members of the monastery.224 A monastic
community that interacted with political and religious authorities as a unity
219. Katja Rost, Emil Inauen, Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, The Corporate Governance of
Benedictine Abbeys: What Can Stock Corporations Learn from Monasteries?, 16 J. MGMT. HIST. 90,
93–97 (2010).
220. See Henry J. Cohn, Church Property in the German Protestant Principalities, in POLITICS
AND SOCIETY IN REFORMATION EUROPE 158 (E.I. Kouri & Tom Scott eds., 1987) (analyzing the
problem of the confiscation of the Church assets, especially of monasteries, during the Reformation).
221. Rost, Inauen, Osterloh & Frey, supra note 219, at 97.
222. It should be highlighted that the Latin term for “chapter” is “capitulum,” and it has several
meanings. It may mean a chapter of a book, a legal body of the cathedrals, an assembly of the religious
fraternity of a single house, or an assembly of representatives of many monastic houses. See infra
notes 334 and 338 (discussing the origins and the etymology of the word “capitulum”).
223. See Gert Melville, The Institutionalization of Religious Orders (Twelfth and Thirteenth
Centuries), in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL MONASTICISM IN THE LATIN WEST 783, 784
(Alison I. Beach & Isabelle Cochelin eds., James Mixon trans., 2020) [hereinafter Beach & Cochelin].
For a comprehensive history of the spread of Monasticism in the West, see id. at 19–72, 162–94.
224. See Emil Inauen, Katja Rost, Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, Back to the Future: A
Monastic Perspective on Corporate Governance, 21 MGMT. REVUE 38, 45–46, 49–50 (2010).
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enjoyed some organizational privileges. These privileges included the
ability to own assets as well as the right to sue and be sued and were
exercised through a centralized system of management of properties.
1. Regulation of Monasteries and the Constitutiones
Medieval monasteries had a structure largely comparable to that of
contemporary corporations.225 The establishment and functioning of a
monastery depended on a charter that governed its legal status,
representatives’ powers, religious and secular purposes, and internal
organization.226 The charters of monasteries were known as constitutiones,
charismata, decreta, praecepta, leges, normae, institutiones, instituta,
ordines, or regulae.227
A charter served as a legal framework that protected communities
from external interference.228 They also set the hierarchy, practices of
administration, and spiritual and economic goals. In addition, monasteries
regulated themselves through their own charters. Therefore, charters also
played a key role as self-governing fundamental rules.
Among the charters of monasteries, the Regula of Saint Benedict,
written in the year 516, was the fundamental law of Benedictines and a

225. Richard Roehl, Plan and Reality in a Medieval Monastic Economy: The Cistercians, 29 J.
ECON. HIST. 180 (1969). Roehl argues that
The Cistercian economic program might thus be categorized as a “firm” rather than a
“national” plan (to employ somewhat anachronistic terminology); that is, [the program]
related to the economy of an individual monastery. But it was capable of indefinite
reiteration, in as many abbeys as might be desired. Thus[,] provision was made for the
growth, the expansion, of the Order.
Id. at 180.
226. See Beach & Cochelin, supra note 223, at 162–67.
227. These terms were interchangeably used just like charters and articles of incorporations. See
Albrecht Diem & Philip Rousseau, Monastic Rules (Fourth to Ninth Century), in Beach & Cochelin,
supra note 223, at 162. Furthermore, authors argue that:
In sum, certainly until the end of the sixth century we have to approach the development
of monasticism under three premises. First, there was no one monasticism but rather an
infinite variety of more or less “regulated” monasticisms. Second, the textual basis of
monastic life—its regula, if we want to call it that—could manifest itself in yet another
confusing variety of different texts and genres. A regula can hide in a story, in an ascetic
admonition, in a theological treatise, in a letter, in a charter, in a law, or in the acta of
councils of concerned bishops. Third, there was, however, a slow development toward a
“regulated” way of life that did use regulae as we know them, in the way that we expect
them to be used. Benedict, the Master, and, to a certain extent, Caesarius could already
make the claim that there is no alternative to a regulated communal life: you either live sub
regula vel abbate or you are a monachus gyrovagus or sarabaita.
Id. at 180–81.
228. Id. at 182; see also Jean-Pierre Devroey, Monastic Economics in the Carolingian Age, in
Beach & Cochelin, supra note 223, at 466.
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model for other monastic legislations.229 The Regula consisted of seventythree provisions and governed all the activities of the monks.230 It
established the property rights framework regulating the life of monks and
the existence of the monasteries.231 Monks had no property rights, but
monasteries were allowed to own property, make contracts as well as sue
and be sued, as entities.232 The Regula also gave abbots the power to
manage the monastery’s property and the right to establish and enforce
rules within the monastery’s jurisdiction, beyond those of the laws of the
land.233
2. The Purpose of the Monastery in the Monastic Law
From an organizational perspective, a monastery was structured
around a common purpose. The purpose of monasteries and monastic law
(propositum) was the criterium governing present and future activities of
the monastery and the monks.234 Ultimately, the purpose of all monasteries
229. Saint Bernard, who was an abbot, used to say: “prima igitur quaestio circa regulam nostrum
versatur, de qua, nisi fallor, et reliquae omnes aut paene omnes oriuntur” [The first question revolves
around our monastic charter, of which, unless I am mistaken, all the rest, or almost all, depends]. See
3 BERNARDO DA CHIARAVALLE, DE PRAECEPTO ET DISPENSATIONE, IN SANCTI BERNARDI OPERA 254
(Jean Leclercq & Henri M. Rochais eds., 1963) (all translations done by the authors).
230. SAINT BENEDICT, THE RULE OF SAINT BENEDICT, (A Pax Book 1931),
https://www.solesmes.com/sites/default/files/upload/pdf/rule_of_st_benedict.pdf [https://perma.cc/H
5BJ-BFVN].
231. Id.
232. See Rost, Inauen, Osterloh & Frey, supra note 219, at 100–01. For the general principles
contained in the Regula, see SAINT BENEDICT, supra note 230, ch. 32:
Let the abbot appoint brethren of whose life and character he is assured and to them, as he
shall judge fit, let him assign the property of the monastery, the various iron tools and the
articles of clothing and all other things whatsoever, to be kept by them and re-collected
after use. And of these let the abbot keep a list, so that he may know what he gives and
what he receives back when the brethren succeed one another in turn in the work assigned
to each. And if anyone shall have treated the property of the monastery in a slovenly or
neglectful manner let him be corrected; and if he shall not have then amended, let him be
subjected to the discipline of the rule.
233. For a discussion of the notion of “monastic libertas” as a form of exemption from the
ordinary judge, even the bishopric one, see Christof Rolker, Monastic Canon Law in the Tenth,
Eleventh, and Twelfth Centuries, in Beach & Cochelin, supra note 223, at 626.
234. This idea is not so far from the contemporary conception of the social economic function
of corporations. For example, the American Law Institute provided a regulation to balance the
economic and social functions of the corporation.
2.01 The Object and Conduct of the Corporation
(a) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (b) . . . a corporation . . . should have as its
objective the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and
shareholder gain.
(b) Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the corporation,
in the conduct of its business:
(1) Is obliged, to the same extent as a natural person, to act within the boundaries set by
law;
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was worshipping God, but every religious order established different
organizational rules in accordance with their specific religious devotions,
usually inspired by the practice of their founders. For example,
Benedictines followed a contemplative lifestyle made up of prayer and
work; Dominicans were preachers devoted to study and education; while
Carmelites applied the rule of Saint Albert and focused on service,
contemplation, and prayer.235
3. The Abbot, the Monks, and Perpetuity
An abbot received the authority to rule a monastery as the
representative of Christ. Abbots had jurisdiction over the monastery and
their tenure lasted for life.236 Monks also made lifelong commitments to
the monastery.237 Monastic charters typically regulated every aspect of a
monk’s existence, including their daily activities, for life (regulae totius
vitae); and monks had to live by the monastery rules until their death
(usque ad mortem).238 Every moment of a monk’s life was sanctified by
submission to the Regula (the monastic law).239 Vows encompassed the
evangelical counsels.240 Poverty and chastity committed monks to
renouncing personal possessions and embracing celibacy. Vows also
included obedience, which committed monks to listen intently to the
teaching of their superiors.241 Provisions regulated the internal hierarchy
(2) May take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate
to the responsible conduct of business; and
(3) May devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare, humanitarian,
educational, and philanthropic purposes.
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (AM. L. INST.
1992).
235. Peter Wirtz, Governance of Old Religious Orders: Benedectines and Dominicans, 23 J.
MGMT. HIST. 259, 266–72 (2017).
236. See Gérard D. Guyon, Un Grand Juriste Européen: Saint Benoît de Nursie [A Great
European Jurist: Saint Benedict of Nursia], 2003 CUADERNOS DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO 49
[hereinafter Guyon, Un Grand]; see also Gérard D. Guyon, Le temps et le droit dans la Règle
bénédictine, 35 STUDIA CARNONICA: OTTAWA 133 (2001) [hereinafter Guyon, Le Temps] (all
translations done by the authors).
237. Guyon, Le Temps, supra note 236, at 38 (all translations done by the authors).
238. Saint Bernard on this point summarized: “Est sane quidam oboedientiae limes, secundum
tempus ipsa temporis extremitas, ut sit terminus oboedientiae qui et vitae [There is, of course, a certain
limit of obedience, according to the length of the time itself, so that it may be the end of obedience
which is also the end of life]”. BERNARDO DA CHIARAVALLE, supra note 229, at 262 (all translations
done by the authors).
239. See SAINT BENEDICT, supra note 230, chapters 1, 5, 8, and 16, the latter dictating “How
The Work Of God Is To Be Carried Out During The Day”
240. John Bayer, Living toto corde: Monastic Vows and the Knowledge of God, 10 RELIGIONS,
July 2019, at 7–11.
241. See id. ch. 3:
As often as any special business has to be transacted in the monastery, let the abbot convoke
the whole community and [themselves] state what is the matter in hand. And having
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of the community and the necessary elections for establishing it.242 This
regulatory framework was essential to ensure that monks could live and
work together successfully.
Unlike lay people living in a secular time (saeculum), monks
regulated their lives within the eternal existence of the monastery.
Perpetuity became the moral legacy of the religious society; a perpetual
written text, a person elected for life, and organizational regulae totius
vitae were the pillars of the corporate organization of the monastery.
4. Monks’ Property and Monasteries’ Property
The monastic legislation in regard to monks’ private ownership was
clear and strict: personal poverty was required from monks. Upon entering
the religious life, the postulant renounced his property in favor of the poor
or of the monastery. Thus, monks had no ownership rights; although they
could technically inherit assets, the inheritable assets did not go to them
but to the Church, or—as Saint Basil used to say—to “the proper
ecclesiastical authority to be disposed of as the latter deems fit.”243
The nature and extent of these rules were extensively discussed in
Christian monastic literature.244 However, in the Regula of Benedict,
which represents one of the oldest monastic charters, the practice of monks
listened to the counsel of the [community], let [them] settle the matter in [their] own mind
and do what seems to [them] most expedient. And we have thus said that all are to be called
to council because it is often to a junior that the Lord reveals what is best. But let the
[community] so give counsel with all subjection and humility that they presume not with
any forwardness to defend what shall have seemed good to them; but rather let the decision
depend upon the abbot’s discretion, so that [they] shall decide what is best, that they all
may yield ready obedience: but just as it behooves the disciples to be obedient to the master,
so also it becomes [them] to arrange all things prudently and justly.
242. See SAINT BENEDICT, supra note 230, at ch. 64:
At the election of an abbot let this principle be always observed, that [they] be appointed
whom the whole community, being of the same mind and in the fear of God, or even a part
albeit a small part of the community shall with calmer deliberation have elected. And let
[they] who [are] to be elected be chosen for [their] worthy manner of life and [their]
fundamental wisdom, even if [they] be last in order of community seniority . . . .
But let [they] who [are] elected abbot always bear in mind what manner of burden [they
have] received, and Who it is to Whom [they] will have to render account of [their]
stewardship; and let [them] know that it behoves [them] to be of service rather than to be
served. It behoves [them] therefore to be learned in the divine law, that [they] may thence
bring forth things new and old; to be chaste, sober, merciful; and let [them] always exalt
mercy above judgment, that [themselves] may attain it.
243. 23 S. AURELI AUGUSTINI, DE DOCTRINA CHRISTIANA: LIBER QUARTUS 56 (1930) (all
translations done by the authors).
244. See also Gian Luca Potestà, Ubertino da Casale e la altissima paupertas, tra Giovanni XXII
e Ludovico il Bavaro, 4 OLIVIANA (2012), http://journals.openedition.org/oliviana/471
[https://perma.cc/AJ5F-6VJ9] (all translations done by the authors). See generally BRIAN TIERNEY,
THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES ON NATURAL RIGHTS, NATURAL LAW, AND CHURCH LAW
1150–1625 (1997).
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owning personal property was considered evil—a practice that has to be
removed from the monastery.245 Therefore, without an order from the
abbot, no one could give, receive, or retain anything as their own, not even
books, writing tablets, or styluses. Monks had to ask the abbot for anything
they needed, and the abbot’s permission was necessary. An abbot could
assign some instruments or tools to monks deemed reliable and
incorruptible, who, in turn, could keep the assets and assign them to other
monks.246 However, no one would consider a monastery’s assets as their
own.
Through a legal fiction, the assets of the monastery were held by the
patron saints of the monastery. For instance, in 910 William I founded the
Monastery of Cluny.247 The charter explained William I’s reasons for
donating much of his wealth to create the order and stated that the order
was founded on the Rule of Saint Benedictine.248 The charter regulated the
separation of the monastery’s property from the monastic community,
attributing the assets directly to Saint Peter and Saint Paul, who were the
patron saints of the Cluny order.249 So monasteries often owned their assets
through their patron saints much like the Romans vested ownership in
divine entities and Islamic jurisprudence vests ownership in Almighty
Allāh (God).250
Since charters typically provided perpetual existence and succession
to the monasteries, a monastery’s assets would belong to the monastery
forever. In general, a monastery and its assets were governed by the abbot
and a few monastic officers. However, the Regula of Benedict balanced
this power by requiring that all important decisions such as major
decisions about the monastery’s assets had to be made by the entire
245. See SAINT BENEDICT, supra note 230, ch. 33:
Very specially is this vice of private ownership to be cut off from the monastery by the
roots; and let not anyone presume to give or accept anything without the abbot’s orders,
nor to have anything as his own, not anything whatsoever, neither book, nor writing-tablet,
nor pen; no, nothing at all, since indeed it is not allowed them to keep either body or will
in their own power, but to look to receive everything necessary from their monastic father;
and let not any be allowed to have what the abbot has not either given or permitted. And
let all things be common to all, as it is written: “Neither did any one of them say or presume
that anything was his own.” But if anyone shall have been caught indulging in this most
baneful vice, let him be admonished once and again: if then he shall not have amended, let
him be subjected to correction.
246. Id. at chs. 22–23.
247. See generally BARBARA H. ROSENWEIN, TO BE THE NEIGHBOR OF SAINT PETER: THE
SOCIAL MEANING OF CLUNY’S PROPERTY 909–1049 (1989). On the importance of the Cluny reform,
see generally GAUDEMET supra note 81, at 332–35 (all translations done by the authors).
248. See Medieval Sourcebook: Foundation Charter of Cluny, 910, FORDHAM UNIV. (Jan.
1996), https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/source/chart-cluny.asp [https://perma.cc/XFG8-VMUN].
249. Id.
250. Antonio D’Emilia, SCRITTI DI DIRITTO ISLAMICO 262 ff. (1976).
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community of monks, including the youngest brothers.251 This method of
collective decision-making was, at least in theory, justified by the principle
of Christian communal unity.252 Communion was understood not only in
a spiritual sense but also in a practical form that included shared decisionmaking.
B. The Cathedral
Cathedrals are typically the bishops’ churches as well as monumental
churches.253 Cathedrals derive their name from “cathedra,” the throne
reserved for the bishop, located in the principal church of a diocese.254
These monumental buildings are a visible product of the medieval theory
of corporation. In other words, cathedrals are the result of an innovative
legal technology based on the combination of legal personhood and
delegated management, which permits the realization of long-term
projects that are able to serve society and future generations.255
Historically, cathedrals’ construction, administration, and maintenance
were delegated to specialized legal institutions known as “fabricae,”256
and “chapters.”257
Both fabricae and chapters were corporations, but they were
characterized by a different nature, composition, and purpose. On one side,
fabricae were partly secular entities, for which ecclesiastical and civic
representatives sat and worked together toward a common purpose.258
Their mixed nature facilitated the aggregation of assets through donations,
including contributions in kind, for building and maintaining the
cathedral.259 On the other side, chapters mainly organized the worship and

251. See Ferraboschi, supra note 129, at 218 (mentioning a letter of Pope Leone to the Sicilian
bishops declaring that donations and sales of ecclesiastical assets must be decided after a discussion
and with the agreement of all the clergy (cum totius cleri tractatu atque consensus)) (all translations
done by the authors).
252. This might remind the corporate law scholar of shareholders voting on the sale of all the
assets of a corporation and on other fundamental changes affecting business corporations.
253. A cathedral may also be called ecclesia mater, which translates to the mother of the
churches. See Cattedrale, TRECCANI, https://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/cattedrale/
[https://perma.cc/FES7-8TDY] (describing this etymology) (all translations done by the authors).
254. See Anna Ravà, Cattedrale, in 4 ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITTO 517 (1960) (all translations
done by the authors).
255. It is no coincidence that cathedrals have been authoritatively used in the corporate law
literature. See Stout, supra note 32, at 697.
256. See Pier Giovanni Caron, Fabbricerie, in ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITTO, XVI, at 196 (1967)
(all translations done by the authors).
257. See Giacomo Cassani, Capitolo dei canonici, in DIGESTO ITALIANO, VI, at 982 (1888) (all
translations done by the authors).
258. Caron, supra note 256, at 197.
259. Id.

2021]

Sacred Corporate Law

455

promoted the mission of the cathedral, but they were also responsible for
looking after the cathedral’s corporate property.260
1. Fabricae
A fabrica is a legal entity entrusted with the task of aggregating
assets and governing the financial resources to design, build, and maintain
a new cathedral.261 One well-known example is the “Veneranda Fabbrica
del Duomo” in Milan, a fabrica established by decree in 1387 to build,
run, and maintain the Cathedral of Milan.262
In contemporary Italian law, fabricae are legal entities that maintain
and restore cathedrals and other historical churches.263 Fabricae run
churches and cathedrals in the interest of the public, even when the local
community is not made up of only Christians. The public goal of fabricae
consists of preserving and maintaining buildings that usually have a
historical and artistic value for entire communities of citizens.
2. Chapters
While fabricae are partly secular corporations, cathedral chapters are
corporations deeply religious in nature.264 Chapters were typically
established to run cathedrals, during or immediately after their
construction.265 Chapters date back to the eighth century and were
originally member corporations that progressively transformed into
property corporations. Initially, they were associations of clerics from a
certain church forming an entity and were instituted by ecclesiastical
authority for the purpose of assisting the bishop in the government of their
diocese.266
In the early period, the name chapter designated certain corporate
ecclesiastical bodies.267 These bodies referred to the cathedral clergy as a
260. The chapter controls the corporate property and directs the affairs of the corporation. It is
the body that governs the cathedral generally and decides whether the corporate body of the cathedral
should enter into a contract or other legal agreement. See GAUDEMET, supra note 81, at 494 (all
translations done by the authors).
261. See Caron, supra note 256, at 197 (all translations done by the authors).
262. See generally Gaetano Greco, Un «Luogo» di Frontiera: l’Opera del Duomo Nella Storia
Della Chiesa Locale. Premessa Storica Sulle Fabbricerie, in LA NATURA GIURIDICA DELLE
FABBRICERIE 4, 4–6 (2004) (all translations done by the authors).
263. Caron, supra note 256, at 199.
264. For the different meanings of the word “chapter” (Latin, capitulum), see Cassani, supra
note 257, at 982 (all translations done by the authors).
265. As far as the Cathedral of Milan is concerned, a new cathedral’s chapter was established in
the same period of the construction. Annali della fabbrica del Duomo di Milano. Dall’origine fino al
presente, Vol. I., Milano, Libreria G. Brigola, 1877, p. IX-XIV
266. See Cassani, supra note 257, at 982 (all translations done by the authors).
267. For the origins of the term “chapter,” see CONSTANT VAN DE WIEL, HISTORY OF CANON
LAW 64 (1990). With respect to cathedrals, the term chapter (in Latin, capitulum) is said to be derived
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group of clerics separated from the bishop and the bishop’s household.268
Over time, the bishop and clergy occupying a common dwelling obtained
the power of controlling the cathedral and its connected estates. Such
power created new entities that were able to own the cathedral and its
connected estates; these entities were called “chapters.”269
Early chapters were characterized by a uniform method of life; their
organization and legal nature were profoundly influenced by monastic
rules. For example, the clergy organized by Saint Chrodegang, Bishop of
Metz (d. 766)—an archetype of cathedrals’ chapters—was a rule-based
community that mirrored the Regula Benedicti.270 By the thirteenth
century, cathedrals’ chapters were fully-fledged corporations, and their
personnel were called “canons”—typically diocesan clerics who had not
taken monastic vows.271 Each canon had a stall in the church and a vote in
the chapter.
Chapters, being true ecclesiastical entities, had all the rights such
entities possessed by their nature and by positive law.272 Accordingly, they
could hold meetings, ordinary or extraordinary, to discuss and resolve
matters concerning the chapter.273 Unless otherwise provided by a specific
statute, the dean or provost had the power to convoke chapters to decide
about matters regarding their own affairs.274 Conversely, the bishop
convened chapters to make decisions about diocesan matters.275
All the canons present in the city were invited to the meetings.276 The
meetings took place at the prescribed time and place. Business was to be
decided by a general and public discussion, followed by a vote. The vote
did not need to be unanimous, unless the subject matter affected the canons
as individuals.277 Canon law generally required a majority vote; however,

from the chapter of the rule book that was typically read in the assemblies of the clergy. After the
reading, any business relevant to the house was discussed in “chapter” and, if necessary, approved by
the “chapter,” as the collective body of the members came to be known. The meeting itself was called
the chapter and the place of meeting the chapter house. See also Mario Gorino-Causa, Canonici, in 2
NOVISSIMO DIGESTO ITALIANO 849–50 (1957) (all translations done by the authors).
268. R. Ignatius Burns, The Organization of a Mediaeval Cathedral Community: The Chapter
of Valencia (1238–1280), 31 CHURCH HIST. 14 (1962).
269. See Ferraboschi, supra note 129, at 219.
270. See SAINT BENEDICT, supra note 230.
271. See VAN DE WIEL, supra note 267.
272. See Ferraboschi, supra note 129, at 222.
273. See id. at 218.
274. See id. at 218–19.
275. William Fanning, Chapter, The Catholic Encyclopaedia, NEW ADVENT,
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03582b.htm [https://perma.cc/24Q9-WYJP].
276. Id.
277. Id.
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pursuant to the regulations of some chapters, a two-thirds vote of the
members, known as capitulars, was necessary.278
Like every other ecclesiastical corporation, the chapter had the right
of possessing and administering the property over which it had dominion.
The chapter could appoint its own officials to administer its possessions,
even without the approbation of the ordinary jurisdiction.279 The
administrator of assets, usually the dean or other dignitary, was determined
by local statutes or customs.280
C. Cathedrals, Monasteries and Corporate Governance
Corporate law scholars recognize principles and governance
mechanics of current corporations in ecclesiastic corporations.
Ecclesiastic corporations’ ability to commit property for a sacred use
meant that assets could be “locked in” for a purpose over time.281 The
Church, a sovereign power devoted to the worship of an eternal God,
provided monasteries and cathedrals with the corporate form, which
entails legal personality, centralized management, and perpetual
existence.282 The corporate form has allowed monasteries and cathedrals
to perpetually pursue their goals while maintaining a certain degree of
autonomy.283
Asset lock-in has provided monasteries, fabricae, and chapters with
the organizational infrastructure that has allowed them to own and manage
property. The features of the corporate form have also provided a line of
succession and continuity. They also protected ecclesiastic corporations

278. Id.
279. “Ordinary jurisdiction” is the power to govern which flows automatically from an office
that a person holds. See 1983 CODE c.131, § 1. Canon law does not define the term “ordinary” but
simply enumerates those who are to be considered such. The Code of Canon Law lists the following
as ordinaries: (1) the Roman pontiff; (2) diocesan bishops; (3) others who are placed over some
particular church or community equivalent to a particular church according to canon 368 (e.g., abbots
nullius and prelates nullius); (4) the vicars general and episcopal vicars of those enumerated in (2) and
(3); (5) for their own members, major superiors in clerical religious institutes of pontifical right and
clerical societies of apostolic life of pontifical right who at least possess ordinary executive power. Id.
c.134.
280. See Ferraboschi, supra note 129, at 219–21.
281. Blair, supra note 37, at 388–389.
282. See generally supra Part III.
283. Again, the example of the Avignon bridge brotherhood society explains the progressive
attraction of the lay associations to the church and the alignment of private and public interests in
achieving the goals of early legal person. See Boyer, supra note 97, at 641–42. The organization of
the society of the brothers of the bridge changed in 1241–1261, when the bishop appointed an outsider
to the position of prior, who was the canon of a nearby church, instead of allowing the brethren to elect
one of their own as prior. Id. The actions of the bishop resulted in the loss by the brothers of their
power over the property of the bridge because the town authorities transferred this function to two
rectors. Id.
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and their assets from division, confiscation, or taxation by secular rulers—
princes or kings—when the control over the territory change.284
Fabricae and chapters facilitated the accumulation and governance
of property necessary to build and run majestic cathedrals. Building and
running a cathedral was essential for communities; this is particularly
evident by observing the structure and composition of ecclesiastic
corporations established with that end. An example is the chapter that was
established at the time of the construction of the Cathedral of Milan. The
chapter was called the “General Chapter” and was initially made up of
about forty-five members, including the duke, the archbishop, and the
most important officials of the city.285 Later, for a couple of decades, 300
individuals were chosen from the population to take part in the chapter
every year.286 These 300 individuals were tasked with supervising the
construction in day and night shifts as well as with collecting offers and
alms.287 The involvement of stakeholders shows that cathedrals played a
key role in society.
With respect to the autonomy of ecclesiastic corporations, an
important characteristic was the ability to self-regulate. For example,
much like contemporary business corporations with their articles of
incorporations and by-laws, a “chapter ha[d] authority to make laws for
itself, provided they [were] not contrary to the general canon law.” 288
These provisions were typically voted by the capitulars and approved by
the bishop. 289 In case of a tie vote, “the dean or bishop ha[d] the casting
vote or a double suffrage.”290
The governance analogies between ecclesiastic corporations and
contemporary business corporations reach further than single corporate
entities and include how parent corporations control their subsidiaries.
Although ecclesiastic corporations cannot achieve control through share
ownership, parent monasteries (mother houses) controlled their
subsidiaries (daughter houses) through governance mechanics. An
example is the content of the Carta Caritatis Prior (Carta Caritatis),
drafted before 1119 by Stephan Harding, the second abbot of Citeaux, in
France.291
284. See RUFFINI, supra note 104 at 12.
285. See Fanning, supra note 275.
286. Id.
287. Annali della fabbrica del Duomo di Milano. Dall’origine fino al presente, Vol. I., Milano,
Libreria G. Brigola, 1877, p. IX-XIV
288. See Fanning, supra note 275.
289. Id. In case of a tie vote, “the dean or bishop ha[d] the casting vote or a double suffrage.” Id.
290. Id.
291. See generally THOMAS MERTON, CHARTER, CUSTOMS, AND CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
CISTERCIANS 1–14 (2015) (ebook) (publishing the text of Carta Caritatis Prior).
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The Carta Caritatis set forth not only principles and goals ruling the
Citeaux monastery, the mother house, but also governance mechanisms
applied to subsidiary monasteries, known as daughter houses.292 The
relationship between the main monastery and the daughter houses was
shaped in a way that ensured shared interests across the monasteries while
maintaining the religious hierarchical structure.293 The Carta Caritatis
provided the governance rules governing the relationship between the
mother house and the daughter houses.294 It established principles of
shared governance across all the houses, including both the mother house
and the daughter houses.295
The Carta Caritatis regulated the assemblies to which the abbots
participated to perform their decision-making power.296 These assemblies
were categorized as “general” or “provincial” chapters (capitula),
depending on the whether they included all the houses or only the houses
in a particular ecclesiastical province or kingdom.297 All the abbots from
all the different monasteries participated in the general assembly, known
as the General Chapter.298 Despite the distance between daughter houses,
principles and goals were methodically respected because all the abbots
would make sure that their monks complied with rules and decisions made
in the assemblies.
CONCLUSION
Religions and sacred law have played a fundamental part in finding
solutions to achieve asset partitioning in developing the corporate form,
and in creating and systemizing corporate law. Shedding light on how
religions, in striving to subtract assets from the ownership of human beings
and committing them to worship, have shaped asset partitioning and the
corporate form provides a wealth of insights on the nature and
foundational principles of corporate law. It also nurtures fundamental
corporate law debates such as the one on the purpose of business
corporations.
The corporate form has sacred roots. Romans’ invention of the
corporation was founded on sacred rituals and on an original ownership
structure based on the legal capacity of Roman divinities. The Church has
292. Id.
293. See MERTON, supra note 291, at 6, point f.
294. See generally id.
295. See generally id.
296. See generally id.
297. See Alisdair Dobie, The Role of the General and Provincial Chapters in Improving and
Enforcing Accounting, Financial and Management Controls in Benedictine Monasteries in England
1215–1444, 47 BRITISH ACCT. REV. 142, 143 (2015).
298. See MERTON, supra note 291, at 11–13.
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played a role in forming corporate law and theory that is second to none.
It systemized the rules governing corporation, and arguably created
corporate law. Islamic jurisprudence has provided solutions to overcome
the tension between Sharie’a’s resistance to the corporate form, rooted in
Islamic law’s principle of an individual’s responsibility, and the necessity
to establish institutions featuring asset-partitioning and the capacity to
contract and interact with society. These solutions highlight the relevance
of fundamental features of the corporate form such as asset partitioning
and the capacity to survive any human beings with stakes in the
corporation.
While this journey into sacred law provides a wealth of insights about
the nature, origins, and features of corporations for contemporary
corporate law scholars, the following points of reflection deserve
emphasis. First, the corporate form has a property nature. Second, the very
structure of the corporate form, including delegated and centralized
management, has allowed institutions such as the Church to achieve
wonders. Third, the strong ties between a social or public purpose and the
corporate form should be more deeply considered in the debate on the
purpose of contemporary business corporations.
The Church has been able to build monumental cathedrals whose
construction spanned multiple generation, because the assets aggregated
and used to build these cathedrals have belonged to fabricae. Fabricae, as
corporations, have been able to pursue their objectives through delegated
and centralized management. Similarly, monasteries have been the
repository of traditions, cultural heritage, and educational resources for
centuries thanks to their corporate form, which, through legal capacity and
centralized management, has provided protection to both tangible and
intangible assets.
While the risks of agency costs cannot be avoided, the wonders of
the corporate form’s attributes have proved to be essential not only to
pursue long-term projects, but also to ensure that society can benefit from
a corporation’s achievements for centuries or millennia. Clearly, this
vision of corporations deviates from a focus on agency costs and embraces
corporations’ mechanics as they are. This vision of corporations also
considers the interest of society in what corporations do. Traditionally, an
assessment of a social, religious, or public dimension in the purpose of a
corporation preceded chartering. Free chartering has changed this
paradigm. But studying sacred and ancient law brings our attention back
to the relation between the corporate form and a social or public dimension
of a corporation’s purpose.
The role of purpose is particularly evident by observing the Islamic
law jurisprudential reasoning that allows certain entities to obtain legal

2021]

Sacred Corporate Law

461

capacity within a framework that is otherwise resistant to legal personhood
for non-human entities. Public interest was the determinant applied by the
Romans to assess whether an institution could be granted the corporate
form. Sacred and ancient corporate law suggest that the debate on the
public dimension of contemporary business corporations’ purpose is
unsettled; sacred and ancient corporate law also offer a path to reconsider
how tight the relation between the interest of society in a corporation’s
activities and obtaining the corporate form could be.

